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The Shape of Things to Come:
A Model Water Transfer Act for California
Brian E. Gray*
Preface
This study of California water transfer policy was prepared under the
sponsorship of the California Business Roundtable, the California Chamber of
Commerce, the California Farm Bureau Federation, and the California
Manufacturers Association. Its purposes are to review California's experience
with voluntary transfers of water over the past two decades, to identify "second
generation" issues that have arisen from this experience, and to propose a
"Model Water Transfer Act for California" (Model Act) that consolidates and
improves the existing water transfer laws.
Although I served as the principal author of the Model Act and
accompanying report, the policies and text of the Model Act were drafted with the
advice of four other academic experts on California water transfer law and western
water resources management. The members of the Advisory Group were:
•
Richard E. Howitt, Professor of Agricultural Economics, University of
California at Davis.
Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Former Director of the Natural Resources
•
Law Center, University of Colorado.
•
Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Professor of Law, Stanford University.
•
Henry J. Vaux, Jr., Associate Vice President for Agriculture and
Natural Resources, University of California, and Professor of
Agricultural Economics, University of California at Riverside.
The Model Act also reflects the comments and criticism received from
water users, district managers, project operators, state and federal regulators,
environmentalists, and other persons who have an interest in California water
transfer law and policy. Members of the sponsoring organizations and I
conducted two sets of focus group meetings with interested parties in four
regions of the state. These focus groups were sponsored by the Bay Area
Economic Forum, the Northern California Water Association, the Southern
California Water Committee, and the San Joaquin Valley and Tulare Basin Water
Users. A separate meeting was held with representatives of the United States
Bureau of Reclamation, the California Department of Water Resources, and the

* Brian E. Gray is a Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the
Law. J.D., 1979, University of California at Berkeley; B.A., 1976, Economics, Pomona College.
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State Water Resources Control Board. I also received written comments on
drafts of the Model Act from a variety of other individuals and organizations.
The four sponsoring organizations endorsed the Model Water Transfer Ace
in May 1996. On June 18, 1996, Senator James Costa and Assemblyman Richard
Katz introduced a preview version of the Model Act as Preprint Senate Bill 15.
In preparing the Model Water Transfers Act, we had to make a series of
policy choices about how best to improve California's water transfer laws and to
accommodate the array of interests affected by those laws. These choices are
described in detail below. At the outset, however, it is important to identify the
premises on which the Model Act and report are based. These premises include:
•
Market allocation of resources, including water, is preferable to
other systems of allocation, such as allocation by government
planning and reallocation by government fiat. A free market for water
would increase both the efficiency of the use of water and the
efficiency of the allocation of water in California.
•
Markets generally do not take into account costs to third parties.
Therefore, the water transfer laws must ensure that market-based
transfers do not cause significant harm to third parties and that any
unavoidable harm is mitigated or compensated.
•
Secure property rights are a prerequisite of all market-based systems
of resource allocation. Although the reasonable and beneficial use
doctrines, forfeiture laws, the public trust, and the panoply of
statutes that protect water quality, instream uses, and endangered
species render water rights (and contract rights to water) less certain
than other forms of property rights, the law must recognize that
parties to water transfers require enhanced protection of water rights
before, during, and at the conclusion of water transfers.
•
Open access to the existing regional and statewide water supply
infrastructure is essential to the creation and expansion of markets
for water in California. This is true both in intraregional and
interregional water transfers.
Reduction of transaction costs would help to encourage future
•
voluntary water transfers. The water transfer review procedures
therefore should be expedited to the extent possible without
undermining necessary protections for third parties who may be
adversely affected by water transfers.
Water transfers are an essential feature of California's water resources policy
and will become increasingly important as the demand for water continues to grow
in relation to available supplies. Thus, it is imperative that California's water transfer
laws keep pace with the economic, social, and environmental needs of the state. In
presenting this Model Water Transfer Act for California, the author and Advisory
Group members hope to build on the experience of the past two decades and to
help give shape to the transfers yet to come.
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Introduction

Water transfers are not new. In fact, voluntary transfers and changes in
water rights have been part of California water law since its inception. Just as
California was the first state to adopt the prior appropriation system, so too was
it the first to recognize that water rights may be transferred—independent of
land—from the original appropriator to another user. Thus, as early as 1859 the
California Supreme Court declared that "[t]he ownership of water, as a
substantive and valuable property right, distinct sometimes, from the land
through which it flows . . . may be transferred like other property."1
Yet, for much of the state's history, water transfers contributed little to the
development and allocation of California's water resources. When water users in
the growing agricultural and urban areas of California needed additional
supplies, they either pooled local resources or sought government funding to
construct new water projects. The hallmarks of this era of development include:
the All-American Canal, which delivers Colorado River water to the Imperial and
Coachella Valleys; Los Angeles' Owens Valley and Mono Basin projects; San
Francisco's Hetch Hetchy system; the East Bay Municipal Utility District's
Mokelumne River facilities; the Colorado River Aqueduct, which supplies
Colorado River water to much of Southern California; and most importantly, the
Central Valley Project (CVP) and the State Water Project (SWP), which
completed what Norris Hundley has called the "hydraulic society."2
The vast interregional water supply infrastructure created by these
projects makes it possible today for farms in Kern County to irrigate their crops
with water from the Pit River in Modoc County, for businesses in the Silicon
Valley to produce computer chips using the runoff from Mount Lyell in the
Yosemite back country, and for the residents of San Diego to drink water that
originated as snowfall outside of Pinedale, Wyoming. Indeed, without the era of
large-scale water development, the California that we know today would not
exist. As William Kahrl has observed, "[t]he history of California in the twentieth
century is the story of a state inventing itself with water."3
It would be astonishing, however, if the allocation of the state's water
resources that occurred over the course of the last one hundred forty years
represented the optimal distribution of the late twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries. As California's economy has moved from gold dust to silicon chips, and

1. McDonald v. Bear River & Auburn Water & Mining Co., 13 Cal. 220, 2320-33 (1859).
The court later held that the transfer of water or water rights "must not be to the prejudice of
the rights of others." Butte T.M. Co. v. Morgan, 19 Cal. 609, 1095, 1097 (1927). This protection
of the interests of third-parties remains the principal limitation on transfers of water in
California. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1702, 1706 (West 1996).
2.

NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., THE GREAT THIRST; CALIFORNIANS AND WATER 201 (1992).

3.

WILLIAM A. KAHRL, WATER AND POWER: THE CONFLICT OVER LOS ANGELES' WATER SUPPLY

IN OWENS VALLEY 1 (1982).
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as the state's population has grown to more than thirty-five million, demands for
water have both expanded and shifted. Yet, the traditional response to the forces of
change—development of new supplies—is no longer an easy option.
Several factors have contributed to this new reality. First, the inflation of the 1970's
significantly increased the cost of new water projects, and the burgeoning federal budget
deficits of the 1980s let to severe cutbacks in federal funding for such projects.4 Second,
the 1981 decision by Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus to include the north coast
rivers in the National Wild and Scenic Rivers System precluded future development of a
source of new surface water supplies that equals the combined annual yield of all of the
rivers of the Central Valley.5 Third, the California voters' decisive rejection of the
Peripheral Canal in 1982 signaled an end to the public's willingness to pay for expensive
new water projects, at least in the absence of showing of compelling need for the new
supplies. The defeat of the Peripheral Canal also demonstrated the power of
environmentalists as a third force in California water politics, along with urban and
agricultural interests.6 Fourth, a series of judicial decisions and other laws required
existing water supply facilities to be operated to protect the natural environment. These
legal developments made it increasingly difficult to construct new projects that
potentially would exacerbate environmental problems.7
In response to these limitations on the development of new water sources,
a number of participants in California water policy argued that it had become
increasingly important to make better use of existing sources. In the late 1970s
and early 1980s, a handful of observers put forward a seemingly radical idea—to
allow free market forces to guide the reallocation of the state's water resources by

4. See David Rogers, Federal Budget Constraints Raise the Pressure in a Long-Running California
Water Dispute, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 1986, at 64, Col. 1; Iver Peterson, Changes Confronting Federal
Agency that Built Water Projects for West, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1985, § 1, at 22, Col. 1. Indeed, the
House of Representatives recently rejected a bill to authorize construction of Auburn Dam
on the American River, in part because of the significant cost to federal taxpayers. See Louis
Freedburg, House Panel Votes Down Auburn Dam, S.F. CHRON., June 28, 1996, at A1, col. 5.
5. HUNDLEY, supra note 2, at 330; see County of Del Norte v. United States, 732 F.2d
1462 (9th Cir. 1984).
6.

HUNDLEY, supra note 2, at 321-30.

7. Significant legal developments included: the United States Supreme Court's decision in
California v. United States, 438 U.S. 548 (1978), that California's instream protection laws could be
applied to the Central Valley Project (CVP); the California Supreme Court's recognition of the public
trust as a limitation on the exercise of previously vested water rights in National Audubon Society v.
Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (1983); the California Court of Appeal’s landmark Bay-Delta opinion in
United States v. State Water Resources Control Board, 182 Cal. App. 3d 82 (1986); Congress’
enactment of the Central Valley Project Improvement Act of 1992 (CVPIA), Pub. L. No. 102-575 §§
3401-3412, 106 Stat. 4706 (1992); application of the Endangered Species Act to CVP and State Water
Project (SWP) diversions from the Delta, see O’Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1995); and
establishment of new water quality standards for the Bay-Delta Estuary, CALIFORNIA STATE WATER
RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, WATER QUALITY CONTROL PLAN FOR THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY/SACRAMENT-SAN
JOAQUIN DELTA ESTUARY: WR 95-1 (1995).
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creating price incentives to use water more efficiently so that the surplus could be
purchased by users in areas of new or higher-valued demand. Early proponents of
"water marketing" in California included the Rand Corporation and the Governor's
Commission to Review Water Rights Law, which published influential reports on
California water policy in 1978. The Rand study involved an extensive analysis of
water pricing and other economic influences on water use and water resources
planning. It concluded that the available evidence
strongly suggests that when the appropriate incentives are
presented to current water users, they will respond by making
their water use more efficient, that water within the state will
on average be put to higher-valued uses, and that the
construction of new and expensive facilities for water
development can be postponed or eliminated.8
The Governor's Commission echoed this conclusion. It noted that increased
"construction costs and concern for environmental quality have made more difficult
the new water supply development designed to meet the projected water deficit" and
concluded that "[r]eforms in existing water rights laws could encourage . . . more
efficient use of water and assist in reducing this deficit."9 The Commission also
observed that "[s]ubstantial variations . . . exist in water values among regions within
the State," which is viewed as evidence of inefficiency in the allocation of California's
water resources.10 The Commission then recommended a variety of statutory changes
designed to create greater incentives to use water more efficiently and to encourage
voluntary water transfers. These changes included protection of conserved water from
forfeiture, authorization of transfers of conserved and surplus water, and a declaration
that the willingness of a user to transfer water may not be used as evidence of prior
waste or unreasonable use.11 Many of these recommendations subsequently were
enacted into law.12
Several years later, the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) became the first
environmental organization to support water transfers by proposing a transfer of
conserved water from the Imperial Irrigation District to the Metropolitan Water
District.13 The EDF proposal was followed by an Assembly Office of Research case
study of a hypothetical sale of conserved water from the Turlock and Modesto
Irrigation Districts to the Kern County Water Agency to demonstrate the economic

8. CHARLES E. PHELPS, NANCY Y. MOORE & MORLIE H. GRAUBAURD, EFFICIENT WATER USE IN
CALIFORNIA: WATER RIGHTS, WATER DISTRICTS AND WATER TRANSFERS 60 (1978).
9.

GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW: FINAL REPORT 51 (1978).

10.

Id. at 54.

11.

Id. at 60-96.

12.

See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1010, 1011, 1244 (West 1996).

13.

ROBERT STAVINS & ZACH WILLEY, TRADING CONSERVATION INVESTMENTS FOR WATER (1983).
627

West

Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008

benefits that could be derived from water transfers.14 Both studies built on the
recommendations of the Rand and Governor's Commission reports and served as
examples of how long-term, interregional water transfers could create incentives for
more efficient use, provide new water to the purchasing agencies at costs lower than
alternative sources, increase net income to farmers within the selling agencies, and
enhance the overall flexibility of the state's water management system. Indeed, for
many of these reasons, the EDF proposal became the foundation of the landmark
IID-MWD long-term transfer agreement.15
Initially, all of these proposals met with skepticism and, in some quarters,
hostility. Ironically, even though the Governor's Commission recommendations
included new laws to provide greater security for the water and contract rights of
participant in water transfers, the strongest resistance came from farmers and
agricultural water supply agencies who feared that water transfers would jeopardize
their water rights.16 In addition, the new proposals for interregional water transfers
generated a widely shared fear that increased use of the market to allocate water
would allow urban water agencies to remove a large percentage of the water currently
used to in the agricultural regions of the state. As Marc Reisner and Sarah Bates have
observed, "[t]he tragic fate of Owens Valley . . . continues to haunt rural California
seventy years after Los Angeles acquired its water rights by perfectly legal subterfuge.
This burdensome legacy has greatly hampered [the] state's efforts to implement water
marketing, even though much stronger protections now exist against a recurrence of
an 'Owens Valley' episode."17 Although Owens Valley may be a particularly infamous
example, it is hardly representative of California water transfers. Rather, until to
modern era, "cities either built water projects to bring in new supplies or, where
possible, condemned the necessary water."18 Moreover, in all of the state's history,
there is no other example of an interregional water project perpetrated by deception,
and no other water development has even come close to removing all the water from
the exporting regions. Indeed, in reaction to Owens Valley, the California Legislature
declared the water rights of subsequent interregional projects such as the CVP and the

14. CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY OFFICE OF RESEARCH, WATER TRADING: FREE MARKET BENEFITS FOR
EXPORTERS AND IMPORTERS (1985).
15. See Kimberly Martin McMorrow & Jeffrey W. Schwartz, The Imperial Irrigation
District/Metropolitan Water District Transfer: A Case Study, in MARC REISNER & SARAH BATES,
OVERTAPPED OASIS: REFORM OR REVOLUTION FOR WESTERN WATER 154 (1990).
16.

See ARTHUR L. LITTLEWORTH & ERIC L. GARNER, CALIFORNIA WATER 224 (1995).

17. REISNER & BATES, supra note 15, at 71. Arthur Littleworth and Eric Garner have added
that "California's history has...contributed to the slow development of [water] transfers, which are
often negatively associated with controversial actions taken by Los Angeles in the early 1900s to
obtain water from the Owens Valley." LITTLEWORTH & GARNER, supra note 16, at 223.
18. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and Markets, 81 CAL.
L. REV. 671, 702 n.107 (1993).
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SWP to be subordinate to the rights of users within the areas from which the project
water originates.19
At least in retrospect, it is surprising that proposals to transfer water through
market processes should have engendered significant controversy. After all, land
and other resources in the United States are freely traded without fear of loss of
property rights or concern that the market is an inappropriate allocational
mechanism. Moreover, water has been bought and sold throughout the state's
history. For example, the Bureau of Reclamation has routinely allowed CVP users to
transfer project water among themselves on a short-term basis. During the 1980s
alone, these transfers exceeded three million acre-feet.20 In addition, a number of
agricultural water supply agencies have established water banks and exchange pools
though which member agencies and farmers can buy and sell water. These more
formal water transfer systems include water banks operated by the Kern County
Water Agency and the Westlands Water District and pooling arrangements
administered respectively by the Sacramento River Water Contractors Association,
the Tehama-Colusa Canal Authority, the Friant Water Users Association, and the
Arvin-Edison Water Storage District.21 Finally, during the 1976-1977 drought, the
Bureau of Reclamation created a federal water bank that purchased and sold water
throughout the Central Valley, and the Department of Water Resources organized a
massive exchange agreement among the Metropolitan Water District, the Los
Angeles Department of Water and Power, users in the San Joaquin Valley, East Bay
Municipal Utility District, and the Marin Municipal Water District.22
These transfers shared one of two defining characteristics: (1) the informal
transfers and ongoing banking and pooling programs were local in scope and the
transferred water therefore remained within the basin or origin or original use; or (2)
the interregional transfers were short-term and the transfer of water out-of-basin

19. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10505, 10505.5 (West 1996) (CVP county-of-origin laws); id. §§
11128 (applying area-of-origin statute to the CVP); and id. §§ 12200-12205 (Delta Protection
Act). In United States v. State Water Resources Control Board, 182 Cal. App. 3d 82 (1986),
the California Court of Appeal interpreted these laws as "reserv[ing] to the areas of origin an
undefined preferential right to future water needs" which exporters must honor as the
inchoate rights are exercised. Id. at 139.
20. See Brian E. Gray, Water Transfers in California: 1981-1989 in LAWRENCE J. MACDONNEL, ED., THE
WATER TRANSFER PROCESS AS A MANAGEMENT OPTION FOR MEETING CHANGING DEMAND 22-26 (1990).
21. See id. at 24-27. Henry J. Vaux, Jr., Water Security and Gains in Trade in Kern County,
California, in KENNETH D. FREDERICK, ED., SCARCE WATER AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 67 (1986);
RICHARD W. WAHL, MARKETS FOR FEDERAL WATER: SUBSIDIES, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND THE BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION 138-40 (1989); G. Paul Zachary, Water Rights May Become More Liquid, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 15, 1996, at A2 col. 2.
22. See WAHL, supra note 21, at 136-38; CLIFFORD T. LEE, THE TRANSFER OF WATER IN
CALIFORNIA 62-65 (1977) (Governor's Commission to Review California Water Rights Law, Staff
Paper No. 5); CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, THE 1976-1977 CALIFORNIA DROUGHT: A
REVIEW 95-97, 114-17, 139-40 (1978). There were a variety of other regional and interregional
water transfers and exchanges that occurred during the 1976-1977 drought. See id.
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lasted only as long as the water shortage emergencies that occasioned the transfers. In
contrast, the new proponents of water transfers had in mind larger goals: to use the
market to create permanent economic incentives for greater efficiency of water use, to
encourage both short-term and longer-term transfers in an effort to enhance the
flexibility of the state and local water deliveries, to respond to acute water shortages,
and to help supply growing long-term demands for water. Thus, to many observers,
the water transfers proposed for the future—in which a "water market" would be a key
component of the state's water resources policy—looked fundamentally different from
the water transfers of the past.
II.

The Contemporary Water Transfer Laws

Beginning in 1979 and continuing over the next sixteen years, the
California Legislature enacted a series of statutes designed to promote and to
facilitate voluntary transfers of water. Although these laws build on both the
common law of water transfers and the long-standing statutory authorization of
changes in permits and licenses to appropriate water,23 the Legislature took the
theory of water transfers far beyond its historical roots. Water transfers were not
simply to be incidental features of water rights. Rather, the Legislature deemed
voluntary transfers of water to be vital to the long-term social and economic
interests of the state. Thus, in one of its early pronouncements on the subject,
the Legislature declared, "that the growing water needs of the state require the
use of water in an efficient manner and that the efficient use of water requires
certainty in the definition of property rights to the use of water and
transferability of such rights."24 In furtherance of this finding, the Legislature
then stated that it is "the established policy of this state to facilitate the
voluntary transfer of water and water rights where consistent with the public
interest in the place of export and the place of import."25
Several features of the modern water transfer laws are particularly
important.26 First, accepting the arguments of the proponents that water
transfers should be a permanent feature of California's water policy, the
Legislature expressly authorized both short-term and long-term transfers.27
Second, in an effort to promote both greater efficiency in the allocation of water,
the Legislature provided that water users may voluntarily conserve water,

23.

CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1700-1706 (West 1996).

24.

Id. § 109(a).

25.

Id.

26. The development of the contemporary water transfer statutes is described in
Brian E. Gray, A Primer on California Water Transfer Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 745, 767-80 (1989); and
Kevin M O'Brien, Water Marketing in California, 19 PAC. L.J. 1165 (1988).
27. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1020-1030 (West 1996) (water leases); §§ 1435-1442
(temporary urgency changes); id. §§ 1725-1732 (temporary changes); id. §§ 1735-1737 (longterm transfers).
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transfer conserved water, transfer water that is surplus to their needs, and
transfer non-surplus water made available by land fallowing or agreements to
reduce or to forego water deliveries.28 Third, recognizing that secure property
rights are an essential feature of any market-based system, the Legislature
declared the transfer of water to be a beneficial use and prohibited the forfeiture
of water that is transferred to another beneficial use.29 Fourth, acknowledging
that the extensive water supply infrastructure of the state is vital to the physical
movement of transferred water, the Legislature authorized "bona fide
transferors" to use state and local water supply facilities to wheel water.30 Fifth,
incorporating and embellishing the common law and statutory prohibition
against injuries to other legal users of water,31 the Legislature acted to protect
"fish, wildlife, and other instream beneficial uses," as well as groundwater
resources from unreasonable harm caused by water transfers.32
The enactment of these statutes significantly liberalized California water
transfer policy. From 1980 through 1995, the State Water Resources Control Board
(SWRCB) approved seventy-six petitions to transfer water based on these laws,
authorizing the transfer of more than 2.3 million acre-feet.33 Included among these is
a series of large transfers of stored water from the Yuba County Water Agency to the
Department of Water Resources (DWR) that have greatly enhanced the DWR's ability
to meet its water supply obligations and to comply with Bay-Delta water quality
requirements.34 Also included are a variety of water exchanges, supplemental supply
arrangements, and dry-year option agreements between large water agencies, such
as the DWR and the Bureau of Reclamation, and the Kern County Water Agency and
the Westlands Water District. SWRCB also has under consideration, pending
completion of an environmental impact report, a long-term dry-year option
arrangement between the Metropolitan Water District and the Arvin-Edison Water
Storage District.35These and other transfers have added valuable flexibility to
regional and state-wide water supply administration. Indeed, without the
contemporary water transfer laws, it might not have been possible to operate the

28.

Id. §§ 382, 1011, 1745.02, 1745.05,

29.

Id. §§ 1024(c), 1244, 1745.07.

30.

Id. §§ 1810-1814.

31.

Id. §§ 1072, 1076.

32.

Id. §§ 1028, 1435(b), 1725, 136, 1745.10, 1745.11.

33.

For a list and brief description of these transfers, see Appendix B, infra.

34.

See Gray, supra note 20, at 12.

35. For a description of these transfer arrangements, see id. at 13-22; see also JAY R. LUND, ET
RECENT CALIFORNIA WATER TRANSFERS: EMERGING OPTIONS IN WATER MANAGEMENT 67-79 (1992)
(U.C. Davis Center for Environmental and Water Resources Engineering Report No. 92-1).
AL.,
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1991 and 1992 Emergency Drought Water Banks, which provided essential water
supplies to critically dry areas throughout California.36
The modern transfer laws also have contributed to the protection of the
natural environment. Between 1985 and 1992, the California Department of Fish
and Game and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service acquired more than
400,000 acre-feet from the Bureau of Reclamation and other agencies to
enhance instream flows for anadromous fish and to augment supplies to
wildlife refuges and other wetlands.37 Finally, the Legislature's authorization of
transfer of conserved water has encouraged conservation investments within the
Imperial and Palo Verde Irrigation Districts with the consequent transfer of
salvaged Colorado River water to the Metropolitan Water District.38
The successes of the modern water transfer laws have underscored the
diverse range of interests that have joined together to promote the influx of
market principles into California's water resources system. Economists have
long supported water transfers as a means of achieving greater efficiency in
water use. The opportunity to engage in water transfers, they argue, increases
efficiency because users are confronted with the opportunity costs of their
existing water management practices. Thus,
[a] market provides incentives to farmers to change their crop
mixes in drought years, to idle marginal land, and to invest in
more efficient irrigation equipment. Urban users are
encouraged to use water more carefully and to install more
efficient water-saving devices when they recognize that their
water bills rise as supplies become tighter.39
Economists also have urged that water transfers would promote greater allocative
efficiency, as well as increased efficiency of use. As Charles Meyers and Richard
Posner stated in an influential report to the National Water Commission in 1971,
when criteria of allocation other than willingness to pay are used, it
is very difficult to decide which uses (or users) of a resource would
be most productive. To answer administratively such questions as

36. See 1 CAL. DEP'T. OF WATER RESOURCES, CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE BULLETIN 16093, 287 (1993). For a legal analysis of the 1991 State Water Bank, see Brian E. Gray, The Market
and the Community: Lessons from California's Drought Water Bank, 1 WEST-NORTHWEST 17 (1994).
37.

1 CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE, supra note 36, at 285.

38. See 2 CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE, supra note 36, at 264. For an analysis of the
Imperial Irrigation District conservation and transfer agreement with MWD, see McMorrow &
Schwartz, supra note 15, at 149-66; Brian E. Gray, The Modern Era in California Water Law,45
HASTINGS, L.J. 249, 296-305 (1994),
39. RONALD H. SCHMIDT & FREDERICK CANNON, USING WATER BETTER: A MARKET-BASED
APPROACH TO CALIFORNIA'S WATER CRISIS 8 (1991).
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whether a piece of land would be more valuable as a site of an
apartment building or of a shopping center is extraordinarily
expensive and time consuming. In contrast, the price system
produces an unambiguous and usually quite satisfactory answer.
The party in whose hands the property will be most productive is
the party who values it most highly and is accordingly willing to pay
the most for it.40
In addition to these theoretical justifications, many participants in California's
water policy have come to support greater use of water transfers for more
pragmatic reasons. A number of environmental organizations have viewed water
transfers as a means of protecting and enhancing the state's instream water
resources. They argue that reallocation of developed supplies through market
transactions should reduce the pressure to build new water projects. Moreover,
by creating incentives to conserve and transfer, a market-based system could
have the incidental benefits of making additional water available for instream
uses and of reducing pollution from excessive irrigation return flows.41 Indeed,
this is the principal reason why the Environmental Defense Fund promoted the
IID-MWD transfer of conserved water described above, 42 and why the Natural
Heritage Institute has advocated greater reliance of water transfers as one
means of reducing agricultural drainage in western San Joaquin Valley.43
Many urban water agencies also have included transfers in their array of water
planning strategies. These agencies now view transfers as a means of obtaining
reliable short-term supplies during times of drought and of acquiring additional longterm supplies to meet growing demands within their service areas at a lesser
economic (and political) cost than through alternative means such as construction of
new projects or requests to encroach further upon water quality and other
environmental standards.44 Indeed, it is for this reason the Metropolitan Water District
became one of the strongest supporters of the Central Valley Project Improvement Act
of 1992, which expressly authorized the transfer of project water to non-CVP
contractors.45 Moreover, as noted above, a number of agricultural water supply

40. CHARLES J. MEYERS & RICHARD A. POSNER, MARKET TRANSFERS
TOWARD AN IMPROVED MARKET IN WATER RESOURCES 5 (1971).
41. See ZACH WILLEY, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
CALIFORNIA'S WATER SYSTEM 30-31 (1985).

AND

OF

WATER RIGHTS:

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

IN

42.

See Stavins & Willey, supra note 13.

43.

GREDORY A. THOMAS & MICHELLE LEIGHTON-SCHWARTZ, LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES

FOR MANAGING AGRICULTURAL DRAINAGE IN THE SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY: DESIGNING A FUTURE (1990).

44. See e.g., Central Valley Project Improvement Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Water and Power of the
Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources of the United States Senate, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 370 (1991) (statement
of Carl Boronkay, General Manager of the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California).
45. Id., see Central Valley Project Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-575, section 3405,
106 Stat. 4706, 4709 (1992).
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agencies also have begun to engage in large interbasin transfers for many of the same
reasons. Since 1989, for example, the Westlands Water District has acquired more than
385,000 acre-feet from various parties, including the Kern County Water Agency, the
Department of Water Resources, and the Modesto Irrigation District.46
Other water agencies have recognized the economic benefits of transferring
surplus water or water that they make available for transfer through conservation or
reduction in demand within their service areas. As noted previously, the Yuba County
Water Agency and the Imperial Irrigation District have transferred substantial
quantities each year over the past decade. And, a variety of other agencies and
individual farmers found it more economically beneficial to transfer water to the 19911992 State Water Banks than to use the water to irrigate crops.47
Finally, the enactment and implementation of the modern water transfer
statutes is an acknowledgment that agencies such as the State Water Resources
Control Board and the Department of Water Resources alone cannot adequately
supervise the administration of California's water rights system to ensure that the
state's water resources are used in accordance with the reasonable and beneficial
use requirements of Article X, Section 2 of the California Constitution. The transfer
laws ease the state's regulatory burden by creating market incentives to use water
efficiently—and hence reasonably—without the treat of reallocation by
government fiat.48 "One need not be an extreme exponent of nineteenth century
laissez faire liberalism to prefer institutional arrangements that minimize the
importance of government in people's lives. One of the principal attractions of the
market is that it involves a minimum of governmental participation."49
The contemporary water transfer statutes therefore reflect the widely shared
view that the market will produce greater efficiency in water use, as well as create
incentives to conserve, by allowing water users to realize the full value of their existing
allocations. This occurs only when each user has the option to decide whether its
current use or an alternative would produce greater net revenues and is thereby
confronted with the opportunity costs of continuing its present water management
and consumption practices. It is the market that "sort[s] out the competing uses for
water and deliver[s] it to those who put the highest value on it" and market prices that
"signal to all potential water users the value placed on water."50

46.

See Appendix B infra.

47. Harold O. Carter & Henry J. Vaux, Jr., Third-Party Effects: The Research Challenge, in
HAROLD O. CARTER, HENRY J. VAUX JR. & ANN F. SCHEURING, EDS., SHARING SCARCITY: GAINERS AND
LOSERS IN WATER MARKETING 44-52 (1994).
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See SCHMIDT & CANNON, supra note 39, at 7.

49.

See Appendix B infra.

50.

SCHMIDT & CANNON, supra note 39, at 8.
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Second Generation Issues

In retrospect, the modern water transfer laws may be seen as a "first
generation" effort to accomplish four basic goals: (1) to use economic incentives
to encourage conservation and greater efficiency of use; (2) to promote the
transfer of water from willing sellers to willing buyers; (3) to provide increased
security to water right holders and other water users who choose to conserve
and to transfer water; and (4) to ensure the protection of third-parties who may
be adversely affected by water transfers, including other water right holders and
environmental uses. Accomplishment of each of these goals is a prerequisite to
the establishment of an effective and fair market-based allocational system.
In varying degrees, the modern transfer laws have fulfilled each of these
prerequisites. As a consequence, water transfers have become a fixture of
California's water resources system. Despite the successes of the contemporary
laws, however, there remain a variety of questions about water markets. These
questions are appropriately characterized as "second generation" issues that
arise from the administration of the existing water transfer laws. These "second
generation" issues include the following topics:
A.

Lack of Coherence in the Existing Water Transfer Laws.

The modern transfer statutes have been enacted seriatim in response to specific
problems that arose at specific times during the past sixteen years. The principal laws
that seek to provide security for the rights of parties to water transfers were passed in
1980 in response to the recommendation of the Governor's Commission.51 The same
legislation also created a system of "trial transfers" in which effects on third parties
could be evaluated on a trial basis.52 In 1982, the Legislature enacted a statute that
authorized local water agencies to transfer surplus water and created a system for
changing water rights on a "temporary urgency" basis.53 Six years later, the Legislature
repealed the trial transfer laws and replaced them with separate provisions on
"temporary changes" and "long-term transfers."54 Then, in response to the increasingly
severe drought, the Legislature provided for the leasing of water in 1991.55 The
following year, it expressly authorized local water agencies to enter into contract with
the State Water Bank and other water agencies to transfer water that is conserved or
otherwise made available for transfer by members of the agency.56

51.

CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1011(b), 1244 (West 1996).

52. 1991 Cal. Stat. ch. 983, § 12. The Legislature repealed the trial transfer laws in
1988. 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 1145, § 2.
53.

CAL. WATER CODE §§ 380-387, 1435-1442 (West 1996).

54.

Id. §§ 1725-1732. 1735-1737.

55.

Id. §§ 1020-1030.

56.

Id. §§ 1745-1745.11.
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These laws have been essential to the creation of a functioning water market in
California, and they played an important role in facilitating the transfer of water during
the last drought. An unfortunate consequence of the sequential and situational
enactment of water transfer statutes, however, is that the law now lacks coherence.
There are four sets of laws that potentially apply to long-term transfers57 and five that
govern short-term transfers.58 Although this state of affairs can be explained by the
serial development of the statutes, there is no justification for having multiple—and,
in some cases inconsistent—laws to govern water transfers.
B.

Protection of Water Rights.

Despite the statutory protections for the water rights of the parties to
water transfers, there exists significant uncertainty among existing water users
on three questions: First, would a decision to transfer water jeopardize the
transferor's water rights or contract rights? Second, if the transfer is of conserved
or surplus water that the transferor arguably was using unreasonably or not
using at all, what assurances does the transferee have that the transferred water
will not be subject to waste, unreasonable use, or forfeiture proceedings? Third,
at the conclusion of the term of a water transfer agreement, does the law
provide adequate guarantees that full rights to the water will revert back to the
transferor? Comments received from the focus groups confirmed that the
uncertainty produced by these questions undermines the willingness of some
water users to participate in the water market.
C.

Water Transfer Review Procedures.

Although the Legislature has designated the SWRCB as the principal agency
to review proposals to transfer water, the Board's authority is limited in practice.
The SWRCB has jurisdiction only over transfers that require a change in the point
of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use as set forth in a permit or license to
appropriate water.59 This means that transfers of water appropriated pursuant to
pre-1914 rights and transfers of water appropriated under permit or license that
do not require a change in the terms of the permit or license are exempt from
review by the SWRCB. As a result of this definition of the SWRCB jurisdiction, the
lion's share of water transfers that have occurred in California over the past two
decades have been undertaken without the SWRCB review or approval.60
The absence of a comprehensive system to review water transfer
proposals is not necessarily a failing of existing law. The extensive informal
transfers among CVP users function well without the involvement of the Board,
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Id. §§ 380-387, 1700-1705.5, 1735-1737, 1745-1745.11.

58.

Id. §§ 380-387, 1020-1030, 1700-1705.5, 1725-1732, 1745-1745.11.

59.

Id. §§ 1435, 1701, 1725, 1735.

60.

See Gray, supra note 20, at 39.
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as do the regional pooling and exchange programs described earlier. Moreover,
there is substantial evidence that the 1991-1992 State Water Banks would not
have been as effective in transferring water during the last drought if transfers
administered through the Bank had been subject to review by the Board.61
Finally, there was a widely shared consensus among the participants in the
focus groups that significant expansion of the Board's jurisdiction would
impede the water transfer process.
Nevertheless, there are three problems with the existing law regarding
review of water transfers. First, from the perspective of the parties to the
transfer, the principal advantage of Board review is the opportunity to obtain
legal authorization before the water is transferred. This approval insulates the
parties from subsequent legal actions for damages allegedly caused by the
transfer that may be brought by third parties. The advantages of this system are
not currently available to pre-1914 appropriators and other users who do not fall
within the Board's statutory jurisdiction. These parties run the risk of a post hoc
judicial determination that the transfer is illegal and that there therefore must
pay damages to third parties who are injured by the transfer. Second, the time
and expense associated with the Board's review of transfers over which it does
have jurisdiction may frustrate some short-term transfer proposals, because the
need for the water may have passed by the time the Board conducts the review
and authorizes the transfer.62 Third, the statutory protections for fish, wildlife,
and other instream uses that may be adversely affected by water transfers apply
only to transfer over which the Board has jurisdiction.63 Thus, the restricted
scope of the Board's review authority severely limits the applicability of the laws
that protect these third party interests.
D.

Protection of Third Parties.

All water transfers are limited by the long-standing principle that the
transfer must not harm other water right holders. This limitation is part of the
common law of water rights and therefore is applicable to transfers of water
based on pre-1914 appropriations64 as well as to transfers of water appropriated
pursuant to permit or license.65 As just noted, however, the statutory protections
for fish, wildlife, and other instream uses are contained in the same laws that
govern the Board's water transfer jurisdiction and therefore are inapplicable to

61.

Gray, supra note 36, at 43.

62.

Id.

63. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 386, 1435(b), 1725, 1725; cf. id. § 1021(b) (water leases
"shall include enforceable terms which will ensure that the water lease will not injure any
legal user and will not unreasonably affect fish, wildlife, or other instream beneficial uses.")
64. Scott v. Fruit Growers Supply Co., 258 P. at 1097; Butte T.M. Co. v. Morgan, 19 Cal.
at 615, cf. CAL WATER CODE § 1706 (West 1996) (codifying common law rule).
65.

CAL. WATER CODE § 1702 (West 1992).
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transfers over which the Board has no review authority. Moreover, the one
statute that purports to prevent water transfers that would "unreasonably affect
the overall economy of the area from which water is being transferred" has never
been used.66 Thus, the current laws grant non-proprietary third party interests
only sporadic and haphazard recognition.
E.

Transfers to Instream Uses.

In 1991, the Legislature authorized existing water right holders to petition
the State Water Resources Control Board to change their water right "for
purposes of preserving or enhancing wetlands habitat, fish and wildlife
resources, or recreation in, or on, the water."67 A variety of questions have been
raised concerning the administration of this provision. One of the most
important questions is how the Board and other regulatory agencies would treat
water that is dedicated to instream uses in the form of a water right. As Greg
Thomas recently observed,
Potential market participants face an obstacle that
[California's instream use statute] does not address and that
can only be solved legislatively: under current law, water
transfers to instream uses will not, in most cases, create
increased stream flows because preexisting streamflow
requirements will simply absorb the transfers.68
Where regulatory standards are established in the form of ambient water
quality or flow requirements, there is a danger that the dedication of water to
instream uses in the form of an instream water right simply would allow the
other water users who are subject to the regulatory standards to increase their
diversions until ambient water quality or stream flows return to the regulatory
minima. Thus, instream water rights would "merely replace water used to meet
regulatory instream flow requirements" and would not "yield a net increase in
actual stream flows" or water quality.69 Until this question is answered, transfers
to instream uses will be deterred, because the transferor has no assurance that
the dedication of water will serve the transferor's intended purposes.

66.

Id. § 386; see Appendix B, infra.

67.

CAL. WATER CODE § 1707 (West 1996).

68. Gregory A. Thomas, Conserving Aquatic Biodiversity: A Critical Comparison of Legal Tools
for Augmenting Stream Flows in California, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 3, 49 (1996).
69.
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The Role of Local Water Agencies.

One of the most vexing issues of California water policy over the past decade has
been the relationship between local water agencies and their members or customers
who seek to transfer water. Most of the developed water in this state is supplied to the
end user by an intermediary agency—an irrigation district, water district, water storage
district, municipal water district, or some other form of local water agency. In many cases,
the water right is held by the agency. The Turlock Irrigation District, which has pre-1914
appropriative rights to the Tuolumne River, is an example. In other situations, the water
right is held by a statewide agency—such as the Bureau of Reclamation for the CVP or
the Department of Water Resources for the State Water Project—which delivers water by
contract to member agencies. The local agencies then distribute the project water to
their respective members. And, in a few cases, water is delivered from the water right
holder to a county water agency to member water districts and then distributed to
individual farmers. The Kern County Water Agency, which receives water from the State
Water Project and distributes project water to member districts within the County, is an
example of this type of arrangement.70
California law presently authorizes members of local water supply agencies to
transfer their individual allotments, but only with the consent of the agency.71 For
example, farmers in the Turlock Irrigation District (TID) may sell their individual
shares of the water allocated by the District to another water user (such as the
neighboring Modesto Irrigation District or the City and County of San Francisco,
which also appropriates water from the Tuolumne River), but only with the consent
of the TID's board of directors. Indeed, in a well publicized case from the mid-1980s,
a group of farmers in the Berrenda-Mesa Irrigation District received authorization
from the District to transfer their water allocations to users located outside Kern
County, but the transfer was vetoed by the Kern County Water Agency (KCWA),
which supplies the water to Berrenda-Mesa. KCWA took the position that if there
was "surplus" water available, it reverted (without compensation) to the agency for
use within Kern County.72 Thus, while existing law recognizes that individual water
users posses transferable entitlements to the water they receive from the agency,
transfers of those entitlements are impossible without the approval of the agency
that holds the underlying water right or, in the case of CVP and SWP contractors, the
intervening contract right.
The current law suffers from a fundamental contradiction. On the one hand, the
transfer statutes are premised on the theory that the price incentives offered by

70. See generally Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Future of Water Markets: Emerging
Institutions, Shifting Paradigms, and Organizations 19-21 (1003) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with the author).
71.

CAL. WATER CODE §§ 383, 1745.02 (West 1996).

72. For a more detailed description, see generally, Brian E. Gray, Bruce C. Driver & Richard
W. Wahl, The Transferability of Water Provided by the State Water Project and the Central Valley Project: A Report
to the San Joaquin Valley Drainage Program, in THOMAS & LEIGHTON-SCHWARTZ, supra note 43.
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potential buyers will motivate existing water users to use water more efficiently and to
transfer water in situations where the net revenues from conservation and transfer are
likely to exceed those generated by the users' current practices. On the other hand, the
law vests the ultimate power to decide whether to enter into transfers in the boards of
directors of the local agencies that deliver water to the users, rather than in the users
themselves. The current law therefore separates the financial incentives that are
intended to motivate water users to conserve and transfer from the authority to decide
whether the transfers may in fact occur.
G.

"Wheeling."

The Legislature enacted a set of laws in 1986 to govern "wheeling." The statute
authorizes "bona fide transferors of water" to use up to seventy percent of the
"unused capacity" of water conveyance facilities owned or operated by public water
agencies to transport the water that is the subject of the transfer agreement.73 These
laws are important, because the availability of a physical means of conveyance is
essential for the implementation of most water transfers.74
In recent years, however, several important questions have arisen under
these laws. First, the wheeling statute defines "unused capacity" as the "space
that is available within the operational limits of the conveyance system and
which the owner [of the system] is not using during the period for which the
transfer is proposed and which space is sufficient to convey the quantity of
water proposed to be transferred."75 It is unclear whether this definition requires
the agency to determine the amount of unused capacity available for wheeling
transferred water based on its own water supply commitments that exist at the
time the wheeling request is made, or whether the agency may conclude that it
has no unused capacity within its system because it might need to use the full
capacity of its system at a later date.
Second, the statute requires the wheeling parties to pay the agency "fair
compensation" for the use of its system and defines "fair compensation" as the
"reasonable charges incurred by the owner of the conveyance system, including
capital, operation, maintenance, and replacement costs, increased costs from
any necessitated purchase of supplemental power, and including reasonable
credits for offsetting benefits for the use of the conveyance system."76 This
definition does not state clearly whether the agency may charge the wheeling
parties only for the additional costs attributable to the conveyance of the
wheeled water, or whether the agency also may impose charges designed to
ensure that the wheeling parties pay the same rates for use of the agency's
facilities as paid by the agency's own members and customers.

73.
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74.

See THOMPSON, supra note 70, at 16-18.

75.

CAL. WATER CODE § 1811(e). (West 1996).

76.

Id. § 1811(c).
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Third, although existing law authorizes the agency to establish conditions on
wheeling that include "water quality requirements,"77 it does not adequately address
the respective rights of the parties where the water proposed for wheeling through the
agency's system is of substantially different quality than the agency's water. The
agency has a vital interest in protecting the quality of the water within its system,
because treatment is expensive and, in some cases, it may not be possible to
adequately treat the blended water using the agency's existing treatment facilities.
Moreover, the effects of water quality degradation may last for years beyond the initial
introduction of the "wheeled" water into the agency's water supply system.
These and other questions have been at the heart of the recent dispute
between the Metropolitan Water District (MWD) and its largest member agency, the
San Diego Water Authority. In response to San Diego's request to wheel water
through the Colorado Aqueduct and other MWD facilities, MDW recently adopted a
set of "Wheeling Principles." These principles would allow San Diego and other
parties to use MWD's system to wheel transferred water subject to ten conditions:
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.

6.

7.
8.
9.

10.

Level Playing Field. Metropolitan customers receiving comparable service
must pay comparable costs for service.
Cost Recovery. Wheeling charges must fully recover properly allocable fixed
and variable costs of conveying water through Metropolitan's fixed system.
Financial Impacts. Use of Metropolitan's system for wheeling must create
no financial harm to non-participating member agencies.
Capital Commitments. Metropolitan wheeling charges must recover a fair
share of committed capital expenditures on the same basis as for customers
receiving comparable service.
Recognition of Wheeling Benefits. Wheeling arrangements will account for
benefits to the Metropolitan system on a case-by-case basis as mutually
agreed by the wheeling party and Metropolitan.
Wheeling Capacity. The use of Metropolitan's delivery system for wheeling
of water supplies must not result in a reduction in Metropolitan's ability to
meet its water service obligation to its member agencies.
Reliability. Use of Metropolitan's delivery system for the wheeling of water
supplies must not result in a reduction in reliability to member agencies.
Water Quality. Wheeling must not result in unmitigated adverse water
quality impacts.
Resource Management. Wheeling policies and arrangements must be
consistent with the ongoing commitment of Metropolitan and its member
agencies to water management programs such as reclamation and
conservation.
Wheeling Preference. Metropolitan should accommodate wheeling
arrangements that would result in water deliveries to member agencies
before arrangements that would result in deliveries to non-members.78

77.

Id. § 1812(b).

78.

METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, WHEELING PRINCIPLES (Nov. 19, 1996).
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San Diego has argued that these conditions are contrary to the wheeling provisions
of the Water Code. It contends that MWD's interpretation of the law would allows
MWD to claim most of the consumer surplus associated with the transfer.
The MWD-San Diego controversy raises an array of other questions that are
beyond the scope of this report. Nevertheless, it provides ample evidence that the
existing law does not adequately define the respective rights of the parties to wheeling
arrangements. Commentary from the focus groups confirms this conclusion.79
H.

Surface Water Transfers and Groundwater Replacement.

During the last drought, a number of surface water users who transferred
water to the State Water Bank increased their use of groundwater to replace the
transferred surface water. Although Water Bank officials approved this practice, a
variety of overlying landowners, water managers, and other public officials in Yolo
and Solano Counties expressed concerns that this type of conjunctive use could
harm other groundwater users and perhaps cause compaction of the aquifer.80
This experience confirmed fears expressed by water users throughout the Central
Valley that unregulated use of groundwater to replace surface water transferred
out-of-basin may cause or exacerbate conditions of groundwater overdraft.
The Legislature addressed this problem in a 1992 statute that prohibits
surface water transfers from replacing the transferred water with groundwater
unless the groundwater extraction is either: (a) consistent with an authorized
groundwater management plan; or (b) approved by "the water supplier from
whose service area the [surface] water is to be transferred and that water
supplier . . . determines that the transfer will not create, or contribute to,
conditions of long-term overdraft in the affected groundwater basin."81
While this law responds to the concerns of landowners and other parties that
may be adversely affected by groundwater overdraft, it suffers from two problems. First,
the restriction on conjunctive use applies only to surface water transfers governed by
the 1992 act, which covers water transfers by local agencies and their members.
Because the statute is the only legislation that protects groundwater resources from
surface water transfers, the existing law is of limited application.82 Second, as a

79. At this writing, San Diego has entered into a draft agreement with the Bass Brothers of
Fort Worth, Texas, who own approximately 40,000 acres of irrigated land in the Imperial Valley, to
purchase water that would be wheeled to San Diego through Metropolitan Water District (MWD)
facilities. MWD continues to oppose the transfer. See James Sterngold, A Blow for Water Independence: San
Diego Strikes Deal with Imperial Valley, Irking Los Angeles, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1996, at A1, col. 2.
80. See Eduardo Bautista & Edward McBean, Effects of Water Marketing on Physical and
Biological Resources, in CARTER, VAUX & SCHEURING, supra note 47, at 57, 66-75.
81.

CAL. WATER CODE § 1745.10 (West 1996).

82.

Section 1220 of the California Water Code provides that
[n]o groundwater shall be pumped for export within the combined
Sacramento and Delta-Central Sierra Basins, as defined in Department
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categorical prohibition, the act would presumptively ban surface water transfers that
involve substituted groundwater use by the transferor even in areas of the state with
high and replenishable groundwater tables where these types of conjunctive use
transfers should be encouraged. Although the statute allows local water agencies to
approve such transfers, it creates no standards to govern this process. Moreover, the
law delegates to surface water agencies authority to regulate groundwater use, which
the agencies would not have in the absence of the surface water transfer.
I.

California Environmental Quality Act.

The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) requires public agencies
that transfer water to prepare an environmental impact report on the proposed
transfer if the agency's actions "may have a significant impact on the
environment."83 The environmental review provisions of CEQA also apply to the
State Water Resources Control Board when it reviews water transfer petitions.
Existing law exempts some short-term transfers from CEQA.84
Environmental impact reports prepared under CEQA often provide valuable
information about the potential consequences of water transfers on the natural
environment, and CEQA itself requires the parties to undertake "feasible mitigation
measures" to lessen significant adverse environmental effects.85 For water transfers
that are subject to the jurisdiction of the State Water Resources Control Board,
however, the CEQA requirements are often duplicative of the Board's own review and
decisionmaking processes. Such duplication unnecessarily increases transaction costs
and should be avoided where the water transfer laws themselves provide adequate
procedural and substantive standards to protect the natural environment.

of Water Resources Bulletin 160-74, unless the pumping is in
compliance with a groundwater management plan that is adopted by
ordinance...by the county board of supervisors, in full consultation with
affected water districts, and that is subsequently approved by a vote in
the counties or portions of counties that overlie the groundwater basin .
. ..
Id. § 1220. Although this statute could be applied to limit transfers of surface water for which
groundwater is substituted, it is easily circumvented. As occurred with transfers to the 1991
Water Bank, the transferor could claim that there is no export of groundwater because only
the surface water is physically transferred out of basin. The groundwater that the transferor
uses to replace the exported surface water remains in-basin. For a more detailed analysis,
see Gray, supra note 36, at 34-36.
83.

CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080 (West 1996).

84.

CAL. WATER CODE § 1729 (West 1996).

85.

CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21002 (West 1996).
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J.

Transfers Under the Central Valley Project Improvement Act.

In the Central Valley Project Improvement Act of 1992 (CVPIA), Congress
authorized CVP users to transfer project water within or outside the existing CVP
service area.86 Although the CVPIA provides that all transfers of project water must
comply with California law,87 it also establishes a complex set of federal standards
with which transfers of CVP water must comply. These federal criteria include:
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

The transfer may not exceed the average quantity of water
delivered to the transferor or contracting agency that supplies
water to the transferor "during the last three years of normal
water supply" preceding the enactment of the CVPIA.
Transfer are limited to "water that would have been
consumptively used or irretrievably lost to beneficial use during
the years of the transfer."
The Secretary of the Interior must determine that the transfer
would not create "significant long-term adverse impact on
groundwater conditions in the transferor's service area."
The Secretary also must conclude that the transfer "will have no
significant adverse effect" on the delivery of water to meet CVP
contract obligations and for fish and wildlife as required by other
provisions of the CVPIA.
The Secretary may not approve a transfer if he determines that
the transfer "would result in a significant reduction in the
quantity or decrease in the quality of water supplies currently
used for fish and wildlife purposes, unless
the
Secretary
determines . . . that such adverse effects would be more
than
offset by the benefits of the proposed transfer."
Other CVP contractors have a right of first refusal to purchase
water offered for transfer to users located outside the service area
of the CVP.88

Transfers of project water to non-CVP users also are subject to a $25 per acrefoot surcharge that is payable to the Fish and Wildlife Restoration Fund
established by the Act.89
Perhaps the most important water transfer provision of the CVPIA is the
modification of the authority that local agencies have under California law to
veto or to place conditions on transfers proposed by their members. The Act
states that local agencies have no authority over user initiated transfers of up to
twenty percent of the water delivered by CVP to the agency.90 For transfers that
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Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 3405, 106 Stat. 4706, 4709 (1992).
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Id. § 3405(a)(1)(E), 3411(a).

88.

Id. § 3405(a)(1)(A)-(M).

89.

Id. § 3407(d)(2)(A).

90.

Id. § 3504(a)(1).
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exceed twenty percent of the project deliveries, the Act limits the agency's
review authority to the criteria set forth above.91
The CVPIA was an historic and important enactment, and its water transfer
provisions were needed to dispel an array of significant questions about the
transferability of project water.92 Yet, the special water transfer rules of the CVPIA
conflict in some cases with the requirements of California law, and the resolution of
these conflicts is difficult to predict because the CVPIA mandates compliance both
with the federal transfer standards and California water transfer law. Moreover, the
existence of federal standards to govern transfers of CVP water and separate state
standards to govern all other surface water transfers is likely to produce confusion
and concerns about unequal treatment. Local agency authority, which is unfettered
by California law, is now divided and circumscribed by the provisions of the CVPIA.
And, third party interests, which are given sporadic and inconsistent recognition
under state law, are afforded far more certain protection by federal law. As transfers
of CVP water—particularly long-term transfer agreements with non-CVP users—
become accepted and routine, the need for separate legal standards to govern the
CVP may well diminish.
IV.

A Model Water Transfer Act

The Model Water Transfer Act (Model Act) addresses many of these "second
generation" issues and proposes extensive amendments and additions to the
current water transfer system. The Model Act embodies most of the idea developed
by the author, the Advisory Group members, and the participants in the focus
groups. In two areas—the scope of the Act and the provisions on local agency
authority—the Model Act reflects by omission contemporary political realities and
leaves for "third generation" studies important questions regarding transfers of
groundwater, mandatory review of transfers of water based on pre-1914
appropriative rights, and the authority of local agencies over transfers proposed by
their members and customers. In a third area—resolution of the inconsistencies
between California water transfer law and the transfer provisions of the CVPIA—the
Model Act recognizes that state legislative reform cannot alter federal law. The
approach to common issues set forth in the Model Act and in this report may serve
as a guide, however, to future consideration of the CVPIA transfer rules.
A.

A Unified Water Transfer Law.

Although an original purpose of the project was to draft a comprehensive
statute that would govern transfers of all types of water and water rights,

91. For an analysis of the water transfer provisions of the CVPIA, see Gray, supra note
38, at 285-95.
92. See Brian E. Gray, et al., Transfers of Federal Reclamations Water: A Case Study of
California's San Joaquin Valley, 21 ENVTL. L. 911 (1991).
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practical and political realities have produced a Model Act of more limited
scope. Except for an important provision on the conjunctive use of groundwater
to replace surface water that is transferred out-of-basin, the Model Act does not
apply to groundwater. Early in the drafting process, it became apparent that
unified coverage of transfers of groundwater and surface water would require
creation of a groundwater management code—a task that is far beyond the scope
of this project.93
Another early purpose of the project was to draft a unified set of surface
water transfer laws that would govern transfers of all types of surface water,
including transfers of water based on pre-1914 appropriations. While many
provisions of the Model Act apply to transfers of all surface water, the central
sections that establish pre-transfer review processes apply to transfers of water
based on pre-1914 rights only at the option of the water right holder.94 In this
respect, the Model Act does not propose to expand the mandatory jurisdiction of
the State Water Resources Control Board. Both current law and the Model Act
require review by the Board only for transfers of surface water that involve a
change in permit or license administered by the Board.
The Model Act contains an important addition to current law, however. It
would allow pre-1914 appropriators and other transferors of the surface water not
subject to the Board's mandatory jurisdiction to submit transfer proposals to the
Board to take advantage of the pre-transfer authorization provisions of the Act that
would insulate the transferor from post hoc claims for injunctive relief or damages.95
The Model Act also would permit such transferors to employ the expedited
processes applicable to transfers of conserved water.96 To the extent that pre-1914
appropriators and other transferors avail themselves of these sections, third parties
potentially affected by such transfers would benefit by the application of a variety of
procedural and substantive protections for fish, wildlife, other instream uses,
groundwater resources, and local economies that do not exist under current law.
Finally, in marked contrast to the existing water transfer statutes, the
Model Act would establish a single, unified set of transfer rules. Thus, provisions
that ensure compliance with water quality standards and other environmental
laws, terms that govern transfers within or through the Delta, protections for
groundwater resources, and clarifications of the relationship between the
transfer laws and CEQA would apply to all surface water transfers, not simply to
transfers based on specific statutory sections as is the case with existing law.97

93. Thus, while the Model Act proposes to revise § 1745.10 of the Water Code, which
governs the use of groundwater to replace transferred surface water, it does not address §
1220 of the Code because that section governs groundwater per se, rather than groundwater
in conjunctive use with surface water transfers. See supra note 82.
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MODEL WATER TRANSFER ACT FOR CALIFORNIA; reprinted in 4 WEST-NORTHWEST 3, Parts D & E.

95.

Id. Part D.

96.

Id. Part E.

97.

See id. Parts B, C, F, H, I & J.

West

Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008

Moreover, there would be a single set of procedures and standards to govern
transfers that are subject to the jurisdiction of the Board, rather than the
multiplicity of rules discussed above.98 This reform also would ensure that the
procedural and substantive protections for third parties apply in all cases that
come before the Board for its review and authorization.
Part B of the Model Act defines the scope of its coverage and set forth many of the
other provisions that would apply to all transfers of water governed by the Act.
B.

Enhanced Protection of Water Rights.

The Model Act would strengthen the legal protections afforded water right
holders and other water users who transfer surface water. These enhanced legal
protections would apply to all stages of the transfer process, including the
consideration and negotiation of transfer agreements, the conservation and offer of
water for sale, the use of water during the term of the transfer agreement, and the
reversion of all rights to the transferor at the conclusion of the transfer agreement.
Two of the provisions on water rights are particularly significant. First, the Model
Act states that, throughout the term of all water transfer agreements, compliance with
Article X, Section 2 of the California Constitution and other laws governing waste and
unreasonable use "shall be determined based on an assessment of the
reasonableness of the transferee's use of the transferred water." This provision is of
special importance to transfers of surplus water of or water that the transferor has
conserved through salvage or other changes in efficiency of use. In such cases, the
security of the transferor's future rights to the water may be in question. The shift of
focus from the transferor's practices to the transferee's uses is designed to assure both
parties that the transferor's alleged prior waste, unreasonable use, or non-use of the
transferred water will not be a basis for reduction or divestment of the rights to the
transferred water during the term of the transfer agreement.
The Model Act thus would codify the practice employed by the State Water
Resources Control Board with respect to the Imperial Irrigation District's transfer of
conserved water to the Metropolitan Water District. In that case, the Board permitted IID
to conserve and transfer water that the Board had concluded was subject to defeasance
for prior waste and unreasonable use.99 The Board's decision was based on a policy
trade-off. The Board may be criticized on the ground that it rewarded past waste and
unreasonable use by allowing IID to retain the economic value of water to which it
arguably has no rights because of its earlier wasteful practices. Yet, the Board
appropriately decided not to divest IID of the water subject to the unreasonable use
order because it concluded that IID's conservation and transfer of such water both would

98. See e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 380-387, 1020-1030. 1435-1442, 1700-1705.05, 17251740 (West 1996).
99. See Imperial Irrigation District v. State Water Resources Control Board, 225 Cal.
App. 3d 548 (1990); Imperial Irrigation District v. State Water Resources Control Board, 225
Cal. App. 3d 1160 231 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1986).
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improve the efficiency of IID's water supply practices and would result in greater
allocative efficiency by allowing the conserved water to be transferred to higher valued
uses within MWD.100
The Model Act adopts this same philosophy. Although it would be
possible to rely exclusively on the waste and unreasonable use laws to enhance
the efficiency of water use in California, it is preferable to employ the water
transfer laws to achieve the same purpose. The Board has exercised its powers
under Article X, Section 2 and related laws exceedingly sparingly, and that
practice is unlikely to change in the near future. Moreover, reallocation of water
and other resources by government fiat should be a last resort, reserved for
those situations in which alternative means (such as the market) are not
available. In this case, water transfers provide a viable alternative to
governmental forfeiture of water rights and therefore should be the preferred
alternative. The Model Act would not remove the Board's authority to enforce
the reasonable use laws. Rather, it simply would direct the Board not to employ
such laws to divest a user of water where that user voluntarily, or under threat of
state sanction, corrects past waste or unreasonable use and transfer the water
conserved by such efforts to a reasonable and beneficial use.
The second significant change to the existing protections for water rights is
the declaration that, at the end of the term of a water transfer agreement, all rights
in, and to the use of, the water subject to the transfer agreement shall revert back
to the transferor. This declaration would be reinforced by the directive that neither
the transferee nor any other beneficiary of the transfer may bring a claim for a
continuation of the water supply made available by the transfer agreement and by
the prohibition of claims to a continued supply of water based on reliance,
estoppel, intervening public use, water shortage emergency, unforeseen or
unforeseeable increases in demand, or any other cause.
This provision is based on statements from all of the focus groups that
existing law does not contain adequate assurances that the transferor's rights will be
respected at the conclusion of the term of water transfers, particularly long-term
transfer agreements. The declarations set forth in the Model Act provide the
strongest possible legal protections for the reversionary rights of transferors.
The "Protection of Water Rights" sections appear in Part C of the Model Act.
C.

Expedited Transfer Processes.

One of the principal goals of the project has been to devise alternative
means of transferring water on an expedited basis while strengthening the
protections in existing law for third parties who may be adversely affected by
water transfers. The Model Act contains a variety of proposed changes that
would help to accomplish this goal. These changes include:

100. For more detailed analyses, see Gray, supra note 38 at 296-306; MCMORROW &
SCHWARTZ, supra note 15, at 149-66.
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Improvement of the Procedures Governing State Water
Resources Control Board Review of Petitions to
Transfer Water.

As described above, the State Water Resources Control Board presently
has jurisdiction over petitions to transfer water that require a change in permit
or license issued by the Board. The Model Act would not expand this
jurisdiction, except to make this pre-transfer review available to other
transferors at their option. Based on comments received from several of the
focus groups, however, the Model Act would amend the procedures by which
the Board evaluates water transfer petitions. The Model Act defines these
procedures in substantially greater detail than does existing law and imposes
specific time limits on the Board's exercise of its investigation, review, and
decisionmaking responsibilities. Moreover, in an effort to expedite transfers
during droughts and other water emergencies, the Model Act exempts shortterm transfers from the hearing requirements of existing law. These procedural
changes appear in Part D, section 403 of the Model Act.
2.

Creation of an Expedited Process for Transfers of
Conserved Water.

In a provocative article on water transfers and third party interests, Joseph
Sax urges that new transfer laws endeavor to protect third parties through what
he termed "formulaic" limitations. The alternative approach of "extensive
participation and elaborate public hearings" he observed, "threatens to make all
but the largest water transfers uneconomic and untimely."101
Consistent with this exhortation, one of the central features of the Model Act
is the creation of an expedited process for transfers of water conserved or salvaged
by the transferor. The goal of this process is to permit certain types of transfers to
occur relatively quickly and inexpensively without substantive pre-transfer review by
the State Water Resources Control Board and without post hoc substantive review by
the courts. As a substitute for these procedural safeguards for third parties who may
be adversely affected by expedited transfers, the Model Act would subject such
transfers to a categorical protection for third party interests. This categorical
protection is written in the form of a restriction on the quantity of water that may be
transferred on an expedited, non-reviewable basis. Thus, the Model Act would limit
expedited transfers to the transferor's historic consumptive use plus water
irretrievably lost to all beneficial uses. Because this water would not be available for
other legal water users, instream uses, and groundwater recharge even if the water
transfer did not occur, third parties would not be harmed by the transfer of such
water. The standards and procedures governing expedited transfers of conserved
water are set forth in Part E of the Model Act.

101. JOSEPH L. SAX, Understanding Transfers: Community Rights and the Prioritization of Water,
1 WEST-NORTHWEST 13, 16 (1994).
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3.

Amendment of the California Environmental Quality Act.

As noted previously, the environmental review requirements of the California
Environmental Quality Act serve the valuable function of informing decisionmakers
and the public about the potential environmental consequences of proposed
government actions. In the water transfer area, however, the application of CEQA to
petitions that are subject to the jurisdiction of the State Water Resources Control
Board can result in duplicative review and unnecessarily increase transaction costs
without concomitant environmental benefits. To address this problem, the Model Act
would amend CEQA in two ways. First, CEQA would not apply to short-term transfers,
which the Act defines as transfer agreements the term of which is two years or less.
Second, the environmental review requirements of CEQA would commence only at
the time a public agency decided whether to approve, to amend, to renew, or to
rescind a transfer agreement.102 The amendments to CEQA are contained in Part B,
section 209 of the Model Act.
4.

Authorization of a State Water Bank and Regional
Water Banks.

In a recent study of water banking in the western states Lawrence
MacDonnell concludes that "[w]ater banks offer a highly flexible framework
within which water transfers may occur. They can operate at any level, ranging
from interstate down to water district or ditch company . . . As an
institutionalized mechanism intended to facilitate water transfers they can
develop clear, well defined rules and procedures that should help to reduce
transaction costs."103 The 1991-1992 Emergency Drought Water Bank confirms
that a statewide bank can provide valuable service in bringing together potential
buyers and sellers and, under severe time constraints, administer an extensive
water transfer program with due regard to the rights of both the participants and
third parties.104 Moreover, as noted earlier, a number of regional water banks
and exchange pools have operated informally in California for many years.

102. The penultimate draft of the Model Act also provided that the California
Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) would not apply to long-term transfer agreements that
are submitted to the Board for review pursuant to Parts D or E of the Act. The purpose of
this change was to recognize that the Board's review is the functional equivalent of an
environmental impact report and that a categorical exemption from CEQA would help to
expedite the transfer process without neglecting environmental considerations. During the
final consideration of the Model Act, however, this provision was removed at the request of
agricultural, environmental, and rural advocates who expressed the concern that CEQA
review would provide valuable information about the potential environmental effects of
water transfers that would not be gained during the Board's review process.
103. LAWRENCE J. MACDONNELL, Understanding the Gordian Knot of Western Water, 41 ROCKY
MT. MIN. L. INST. 22-1, 22-60 (1995).
104.
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The Model Act would build on these experiences and authorize the creation of a
State Water Bank and regional water banks. The banks would be empowered to
undertake a variety of actions to facilitate voluntary water transfers. As with the 19911992 State Water Bank, the banks would have authority to supervise transfers that are
exempt from mandatory review by the Board. Moreover, the State Water Bank would
be given permanent authority to administer the expedited transfer provisions of Part
E, and the Board could delegate similar authority to regional water banks. This direct
supervision of expedited transfers would reduce duplicative administrative
requirements and would enhance the ability of agencies involved in the day-to-day
administration of expedited water transfers to move water quickly through the banks.
The water bank provisions of the Model Act appear in Part J.
D.

Expanded Protections for Third Party Interests.

The National Research Council concluded its influential report on water
transfers with the observation that
recognition and protection of third part interests are essential if
water transfers are to achieve their potential to reallocate water to
meet new demands . . . Transfers can bring the benefits of the
market to a system that has often subordinated efficiency to
distributional concerns. But the West has never treated water as
just another commodity and should not do so now. There must be
a balance between efficiency and fairness. Each jurisdiction must
devise its own laws and processes to achieve this balance.105
The Model Act would expand the existing protection for third party
interests in a variety of ways:
1.

Improvement of Considerational Protections.

As described above, the State Water Resources Control Board would have
jurisdiction under Part D of the Model Act over water transfers that require a
chance in a permit or license administered by the Board and other transfers that
the parties may submit to the Board for its review. The Board would evaluate
proposed transfers under a set of three substantive standards that are designed
to ensure that third parties would not be harmed by the transfer of water. Based
on suggestions received from the focus groups, these standards create a legal
hierarchy that would distinguish between transfers that are unlikely to harm
third parties (for example, short-term transfers and transfers limited to the
transferor's prior consumptive use) and those that have greater potential to
cause harm to other legal water users, instream uses, and local economies (for

105.

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND

THE ENVIRONMENT 8 (1992).
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example, long-term transfers based on the fallowing or retirement of previously
irrigated land). This legal hierarchy would be divided in the following manner:
a.

Short-term Transfer Agreements.

For short-term transfers—which the Model Act defines as proposals or
agreements the term of which is two years or less—the Board would be directed
to approve the proposal unless it determined that the transfer would result in
significant injury to any legal user of water or would unreasonably affect fish,
wildlife, or other instream beneficial uses. The petitioner would have the burden
of producing prima facie evidence that the proposed transfer would comply with
these standards. The establishment of a prima facie case then would shift the
burden of proof to opponents of the transfer to establish that the proposed
transfer would not comply with the foregoing requirements.
b.

Long-term Transfer Agreements.

Long-term transfers—proposals or agreements to transfer water over a
term longer than two years—have a far greater potential to cause irreparable
harm to third parties. For this reason, the Model Act would prohibit the Board
from approving a long-term transfer unless it concluded that the transfer would
not result in significant injury to any legal user of water and would not
unreasonably affect fish, wildlife, or other instream beneficial uses. In these
cases, the burden of proof would remain on the petitioner throughout the
proceedings.
c.

Long-Term Agreements Based on Land Fallowing
or Retirement.

Some types of long-term transfers have the potential to create undue
burdens on the economies and local governments in the area from which water
was transferred. For example, in 1992, the Yolo County Board of Supervisors
submitted a $129,305.00 bill to the Department of Water Resources
for reimbursement for the County's additional expenditures for
General Assistance and Aid to Families With Dependent Children
allegedly caused by the increase in unemployment attributable to
land fallowing and the transfer of water to the 1991 Water bank. The
Board of Supervisors estimated that the fallowing of 40,200 acres in
Yolo County decreased the demand for agricultural labor, services,
and supplies within the County and consequently put 450 persons
out of work. The unemployed workers then made claims for general
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assistance and AFDC entitlements, which in turn increased the
County's social services costs by $129, 305.00.106
Although this claim was not sustained, it does illustrate the concerns that local
communities have that some water transfers based on land fallowing or
retirement may cause unemployment, reduce local taxes, and increase social
services expenses.
To address these concerns, the Model Act would impose a third
substantive criterion on long-term transfers that are derived from the fallowing
or retirement of previously irrigated land and that would change the place of use
or transfer the water to uses outside the county or counties in which the water
previously has been used. In addition, to the standards that protect other legal
water users and fish, wildlife, and other instream beneficial uses described
above, the Board could not approve a petition for this type of transfer if is
concluded that "the proposed transfer would cause substantial harm to the
economy in the area from which the water is to be transferred." In making this
determination, the Board would be required to "consider any actions that the
petitioner or other parties to the transfer agreement have taken to mitigate
harm to the economy in the area from which the water is to be transferred." The
burden of proof would be placed on the petitioner.107
These substantive standards are derived from existing law, which contains
protections for other legal water users; fish, wildlife, and other instream beneficial
uses; and, in one instance, the local economy of the area from which water is
transferred. The Model Act would expand these protections in two ways. First, as
discussed above, it would create incentives for transferor's who are not currently
subject to the Board's jurisdiction to use the water transfer procedures set forth in
Part D. To the extent that this occurs, these transfers would be governed by the
substantive third party protection standards. Second, the lone protection for local
economies in current law applies only to transfers of conserved or surplus water
governed by sections 380-387 of the Water Code.108 This statute has never been

106.

Gray, supra note 36, at 41.

107. In recognition of the desirability of encouraging water transfers to create financial
incentives to retire irrigated land within the drainage problem area of the Western San Joaquin
Valley, the standard of review described in this paragraph would not apply to long-term water
transfers based on the fallowing or retirement of previously irrigated land within the San Joaquin
Valley Drainage Program study area—as defined in U.S. DEPARTMETN OF THE INTERIOR & CALIFORNIA
RESOURCES AGENCY, A MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR AGRICULTURAL SUBSURFACE DRAINAGE ON THE WESTSIDE OF
THE SAN JOAQUIN VALLY: FINAL REPORT OF THE SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY DRAINAGE PROGRAM (1990)—that the
Board concludes would contribute to the reduction of agricultural drainage that adversely affects
surface water or groundwater quality.
108. Section 386 of the Water Code states that the Board "may approve any change
associated with a transfer pursuant to this chapter only if it finds that the change...does not
unreasonably affect the overall economy of the area from which water is being transferred."
CAL. WATER CODE § 386 (West 1996) (emphasis added).
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applied, because no transfers have been undertaken pursuant to these sections of
the Code.109 By extending the protection for local economies to all transfers
reviewed by the Board under Part D, the Model Act would ensure that this third
party interest is included in the evaluation of all long-term transfers based on the
fallowing or retirement of previously irrigated land, which are the transfers that have
the greatest potential to harm local interests.
The third party protections standards applicable to transfers of water
pursuant to Part D of the Model Act are set forth in section 404.
2.

Categorical Protection of Third Parties Potentially
Affected by Expedited Transfers of Conserved Water.

For expedited transfers of conserved water undertaken pursuant to Part E, the
Model Act provides a different type of protection for third party interests. As
described above, expedited transfers are limited to the transferor's historic
consumptive use plus any water that is irretrievably lost to all beneficial uses. This
limitation on the quantity of water that may be transferred on an expedited basis
establishes a categorical protection for third parties, in contrast to the
considerational approach applicable to transfers governed by Part D. Because the
transferred water would not be available for other legal water users, instream uses,
and groundwater recharge even if the expedited transfer did not occur, these third
party interests should not be harmed by the transfer of such water.
To provide extra protection for local economies, the Model Act states that
long-term transfers based on land fallowing or retirement are not eligible for the
expedited water transfer procedures and must be reviewed by the State Water
Resources Control Board in accordance with the general transfer standards and
procedures of Part D. Moreover, as an additional precaution, transferees who receive
water transferred on an expedited basis would be required to post security of five
dollars per acre-foot to provide monetary compensation to third parties who may be
injured despite the categorical protections. Claims for compensation would be
subject to binding arbitration. All funds not required to satisfy judgments based on
the compensation claims would be returned to the transferee.
The categorical protections for third party interests associated with
expedited transfers may be found in Part E, sections 502 and 503. The security
and compensation provisions appear in Part E, section 505 and 506.
3.

Protection of Groundwater Resources.

As noted above, a 1992 statute that governs transfers of water by local
agencies prohibits transferors of surface water from initiating or increasing their
use of groundwater to replace the transferred surface water unless the
groundwater pumping is authorized by a local groundwater management plan

109.
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or is approved by the local agency.110 The purpose of this statute is to guard
against conditions of long-term overdraft of the groundwater basin.
The Model Act would change this statue in four respects. First, it would
prohibit the substitution of groundwater for surface water transferred out of
basins that the Department of Water Resources has designated in the Bulletin
118 Series as "subject to critical conditions of overdraft." This prohibition would
not apply, however, to the use of groundwater that has been "stored for the
purpose of subsequent extraction for surface water replacement or direct
transfer as part of a groundwater banking program carried out by direct
recharge, delivery of surface water in lieu of groundwater pumping, or by other
means." The purpose of this restriction is to prevent surface water transferors
from initiating or increasing their use of groundwater to replace exported
surface water supplies in those basins that are in sustained conditions of
overdraft. The groundwater basins that currently would be covered by this
restriction are: the Santa Cruz-Pajaro basin; the Cuyuma Valley basin; the
Ventura County basin; the Eastern San Joaquin County basin; and the
Chowchilla, Madera, Kings, Kaweah, Tulare Lake, Tule, and Kern County
basins.111 The list of groundwater basins protected by this export prohibition
would change as DWR updates the Bulletin 118 Series.
Second, the Model Act would authorize transfers of surface water for
which groundwater is substituted from basins that are not subject to critical
conditions of overdraft, subject to three criteria:
a.
The transferor must have legal authority to use groundwater and may
not exceed his or her groundwater rights under state and local law.
b.
The transferor's use of groundwater must be consistent with all valid
laws that govern the extraction, appropriation; and use of
groundwater, including groundwater management statutes, local
groundwater management plans adopted pursuant to sections
10750 through 10755.4 of the Water Code, city or county ordinances
authorized by the recent decision in Baldwin v. County of Tehama,112
judicial decisions and decrees governing the extraction and use of
groundwater, and the provisions of CEQA.
c.
The transferor's use of groundwater may not cause the long-term
operating safe yield of the groundwater basin to be exceeded.
Third, inasmuch as the purpose of local control is to protect the sustained
production of the aquifer, the Model Act states that local groundwater
management plans and ordinances may not prohibit the use of groundwater to
replace transferred surface water except as necessary to ensure that the long-

110.

CAL. WATER CODE § 1745.10 (West 1996).

111.

CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, GROUND WATER BASINS IN CALIFORNIA; A REPORT TO THE
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE IN RESPONSE TO WATER CODE SECTION 12924, 4 (1980) (Bulletin 118-80).
112.

31 Cal. App. 4th 166 (1994).
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term operating safe yield of the aquifer is not exceeded as a result of the
conjunctive use arrangement.
Fourth, these limitations on groundwater replacement would apply to all
surface water transfers. In contrast, the existing restrictions apply only to
transfers of surface water by local agencies governed by sections of the 1992
legislation.113 The protection for groundwater resources are set forth in Part B,
section 208, of the Model Act.
4.

Clarification of Other Laws Governing Protection of
Third Party Water Rights, Instream Resources, and
Water Quality.

The final set of protection for third parties are clarifications of the
responsibility of water transferors to comply with a variety of laws governing
water rights, instream resources, and water quality. Thus, the Model Act would
codify the established principle that, throughout the term of all water transfer
agreements, the parties to the transfer
shall comply with all requirements of federal law and state law
where applicable, including but not limited to: Article X, Section 2
of the California Constitution; sections 1410-1418 of the
California Civil Code; other provisions of this Code; terms and
conditions imposed by permit or license administered by the
State Water Resources Control Board; and other judicial and
administrative decisions respecting water rights, water quality,
and other beneficial uses.
Existing law also provides that water leases that transfer water within or
through the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta must include sufficient "carriage water"
to maintain the same quality water that would exist in the absence of the lease, as
well as water for salinity repulsion and other environmental purposes are required
by the State Water Resources Control Board.114 The Model Act would rewrite these
requirements to state that transfers of water within or through the Delta may not
cause a violation of the water quality standards (including flow requirements and
temperature standards) applicable to the Delta as established under state and
federal law. The Board would promulgate regulations to implement the
requirement, and compliance with the regulations would be deemed compliance
with the statutory requirement. The Model Act would also extend this protection for
Delta water quality to all types of transfers within or through the Delta. In contrast,
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the current law limits the express statutory protections only to transfers based on
the water leasing provisions of the Water Code.115
These clarifications are set forth respectively in Part B, sections 205 and 206.
E.

Transfers to Instream Uses.

The Model Act would also address the problem that transferors of water to
instream uses have no assurance under existing law that the water they dedicate
to instream protection will actually achieve their intended purposes. As
described previously, this uncertainty arises because the current instream
transfer law does not require water quality administrators to set aside from the
regulatory standards water held in the form of an instream water right.
The Model Act declares that all water that is transferred to instream uses
shall be in addition to water devoted to instream uses pursuant to federal, state,
or local regulatory requirements. This would mean that the State Water
Resources Control Board and other water quality agencies would be prohibited
from including in their calculation of the amount of water of flows needed to
meet water quality or minimum stream flow standards any water transferred to
instream uses and thus held as an instream water right. Based on
recommendations from the focus groups, the Model Act adds the caveat that if
the transferor chooses to use the water transferred to instream uses for the
purpose of satisfying its obligations under such regulatory standards, that water
would be credited toward the transferor's regulatory responsibilities.
The instream transfer provisions are set forth in Part F of the Model Act.
F.

Local Agency Authority and "User Initiated" Transfers.

One of the original goals of the project was to define more precisely the
respective powers of local water agencies and their members or customers who seek
to transfer water. As discussed supra, Part III.F, California law presently authorizes
water users within an agency to transfer their individual water entitlements, but only
with consent of the agency. This arrangement separates the price incentives that serve
as the inducement to voluntary water transfers from the power to decide whether to
engage in such a transfer. For a market-based allocational system to function properly,
the price incentive, which is directed at the user, must be joined with the
decisionmaking authority, which is now held by the agency.116 Moreover, unlimited
agency control may stifle transfers proposed by their members or customers, because
the agency may claim as "surplus" any water that the users offer for sale to purchasers
located outside the agency.117 These concerns are particularly important in California,

115.

Id.

116.

See e.g., Gray, supra note 38, at 279-83.

117.

For a thoughtful analysis on this issue, see THOMPSON, supra note 18, at 723-39.
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because the lion's share of water used in this state is supplied and therefore controlled
by local water agencies.118
The draft of the Model Act that was reviewed by the focus groups
addressed the question of user initiated transfers by establishing criteria to
govern the local agency's consideration of transfers proposed by their members
and customers. The draft provided:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, members and
customers of local water agencies may transfer water with the
approval of the governing board of the agency. Local agencies
shall make available their water supply and distribution
system to the extent necessary to implement transfers by their
members and customers. Subject to the requirements of this
section, the financial terms and operational conditions of such
transfers shall be established by agreement of the local agency
and the members or customers who participate in the transfer.
A local agency may deny or place terms and conditions on
water transfers proposed by their members and customers only
in accordance with the following standards:
a. The agency shall have authority to ensure that the
transfer does not deprive members and customers of
the agency who do not participate in the transfer of
surface water, surface runoff, return flow, percolating
water, or groundwater to which the nonparticipating
members and customers would have been entitled
under contract, agency regulation, bylaw, or other
legal authority if the proposed transfer did not occur.
b. The agency shall have authority to protect the
groundwater resources over which it has jurisdiction
or proprietary rights from exceedence of the longterm sustainable yield of the groundwater basin
caused by the transfer or to which the transfer would
contribute significantly.
c. The agency shall have authority to protect the land,
wetlands, surface water, groundwater, fish and
wildlife, and other natural resources within its
jurisdiction from pollution or degradation that would

118. Farm and ranch surveys and other census date include that between 51 percent
and 68 percent of all irrigated acreage in California receives water supplied by an institution,
rather than from water rights owned by the individual irrigators. See id. at 687. Because these
data include groundwater, the percentage of surface water supplied by local agencies is even
greater.
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be caused by the transfer or to which the transfer
would contribute significantly.
The agency shall have authority to ensure that the
transfer does not increase the cost of water or other
service provided by the agency to its members and
customers who do not participate in the transfer.
The agency may also charge a reasonable fee for the
administrative expenses and operation and
maintenance costs incurred in the review, negotiation,
or implementation of the transfer (including any
additional power costs required to effectuate the
transfer). The agency shall credit to the transferor any
operation and maintenance cost savings (including any
decrease in power costs) attributable to the transfer.

The draft also would have referred disputes between the agencies and their members
or customers to binding arbitration and would have placed the burden of proving
compliance with the foregoing criteria on the local water agency.
In contract, the final version of this section as it appears in the Model Act
states simply:
Members and customers of local water agencies may transfer
water with the approval of the governing board of the agency.
The financial terms and operational conditions of such
transfers shall be established by agreement of the local agency
and the members or customers who participate in the transfer.
This significant change from the draft to the final version was made in
deference to strong statements received from the two Central Valley focus groups.
Participants in those meetings argued that most districts are now receptive to water
transfers by their members and recommend that individual districts be given time to
establish their own policies on this question. Several participants also stated that
legislative intervention in this area would be counterproductive, because it could
heighten concerns of those district board members who are opposed to or fear
water transfers. We ultimately were persuaded by these arguments and therefore
removed the criteria governing agency review of user initiated transfers from the
Model Act. The section from the earlier draft would be available as an alternative
solution to this problem, however, if the decentralized, agency-by-agency approach
fails to allow members and customers of local agencies to initiate and to engage in
individual water transfers.
A noted previously, the Central Valley Project Improvement Act of 1992
declares that up to twenty percent of the water delivered to CVP contractors may
be transferred by the individual members of the contracting agencies, subject
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only to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior.119 The future experience
under this law will serve as a useful comparison with existing California law. If
there are significant user initiated transfers within the CVP, and relatively little
activity in non-CVP contracting agencies that maintain restrictive transfer rules,
it may become necessary to amend California law to limit the authority of local
agencies by the criteria set forth above.
The provisions of the Model Act that address the authority of local agencies over
transfers proposed by their members and customers are set forth in Part H.
G.

Reduction of Constraints on Wheeling.

Barton Thompson has observed that
[a]ccess to existing transportation systems can. . .become an
important constraint on water markets. . . .[As] market activity
increases, . . .transportation access is likely to become a
serious issue. Indeed, access issues have already begun to
worry and influence some purchasers who fear that the owners
or operators of transportation facilities will use their power
over transfers either to control water markets or garner
additional rents.120
As discussed earlier, San Diego's contentious negotiations with the
Metropolitan Water District to wheel acquired water through MWD's system
confirm this hypothesis.
The Model Act would modify the wheeling provisions of existing law in
three important respects. First, although it would continue the current
authorization of the use of up to seventy percent of the "unused capacity" of
public water supply systems for wheeling,121 the Act would require the
calculation of "unused capacity" to be made at the time the wheeling request is
filed. The Model Act also would define "unused capacity" as
the portion of the public water supply agency's supply system,
if any, not required by the agency during the term of the water
transfer agreement to supply water obtained by the agency or
its members and customers from water rights, contracts, or
other entitlements that exist at the time the legal water user
requests permission to use the agency's water supply system.

119. Central Valley Project Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 3405(a)(1), 106
Stat. 4706 (1992).
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These changes would prohibit the agency from denying or limiting a wheeling
request based on the agency's prediction that it might need currently available
capacity in its system for its own uses, even though it does not presently have
binding legal commitments to supply such uses. The new definition also would
prevent the agency from making all wheeling agreements subordinate to its own
future use of the system, unless the wheeling party agreed to such a
subordination. Under this approach to "unused capacity," the agency would be
protected to the extent that it has firm legal obligations to use presently available
unused capacity in the future. In addition, agencies also would be protected by
the seventy percent limitation on the mandated opening of unused capacity.
Second, the Model Act would clarify the criteria applicable to the agency's
evaluation of requests to wheel water through its system. The agency would
have authority to protect its own existing water supply obligations, water quality
within its system, and its financial interests.
Third, the Model Act would alter the existing statutory definition of "fair
reimbursement." The new definition would allow the agency to charge the
wheeling party for the marginal costs of transporting water through its system.
The Model Act would prevent the agency, however, from fixing rates for wheeling
at the same rates charged to the agency's own members or customers, unless
equal rates were justified by the marginal costs of the wheeling. The Act also
would prohibit the agency from imposing "stranded investment" charges or
otherwise obtaining a share or the consumer surplus generated by the water
transfer that forms the basis of the wheeling arrangement.
The wheeling provisions of the Model Act may be found in Part I.
V.

Conclusion

The Water Transfer Act is the product of a comprehensive and exhaustive
evaluation of California's water transfer laws in the light of sixteen years of
experience with the modern transfer statutes. The transfers that have occurred
during these years have firmly established the concept of voluntary allocation of
the state's water resources in response to market-based incentives as one of the
cornerstones of California's water policy. This "first generation" experience has
generated an array of "second generation" issues, many of which are addressed
in this Model Act. Although we have left a few such issues for future studies, we
do so with the understanding that California's water transfer policies will
continue to evolve in response to the state's ever changing hydrologic,
economic, environmental, and social conditions. There will, in short, be
opportunities for reconsideration of the water transfer laws—including the
questions left unresolved by this report—in light of "third generation" policy
issues and subsequent experiences.
The Model Water Transfer Act therefore should be viewed as a beginning
point for the future debate over water transfers in California. Although water
marketing is not a panacea, water transfers are now a vital component of
California's water policy and will continue to grow in importance as the
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demands for water evolve and expand relative to supply. The challenge for all
participants and interested observers is to devise better means of freeing the
market, enhancing the security of water and contract rights, expediting the
regulatory and review processes, ensuring the protection of third parties, and
opening the channels of supply and distribution.
APPENDIX A:

Summary of the Model Act

The balance of this report is a working outline and summary of the Model
Water Transfer Act. It should be read in conjunction with the text of the Act, but not
as a substitute for the Act itself. For the language of the Act reveals, far more clearly
than can any summary, the policy choices and pragmatic decisions that form the
basis of this comprehensive reconsideration of California's water transfer laws.
The Model Act is divided into twelve Parts, each of which covers a
particular topic area. The Parts are:
Part A
Purposes and Policies
Part B
General Authority
Part C
Protection of Water Rights
Part D
General Standards and Procedures Governing
Transfers of Water
Part E
Standards and Procedures for Expedited Transfers of
Conserved Water
Transfers of Water to Instream Uses
Part F
Part G
Water Transfer Fees
Part H
Authority of Local Water Agencies
Part I
Wheeling
Part J
Water Banks
State Water Resources Control Board
Part K
Part L
Miscellaneous
This section of the report provides a summary of the twelve topic areas
covered by the Model Act.
Part A: Purposes and Policies
Part A describes the purposes and policies of the Act.
Section 101 begins with the declaration that "the voluntary transfer of
water is an essential feature of water resources management and planning" in
California and that such transfers "improve the administration of California's
existing water resources by increasing the flexibility of water supply and
allocation, particularly during droughts and other water shortages." It also states
that water transfers are in the public interest and promote the purposes of
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Article X, Section 2 of the California Constitution.122 Section 101 further declares
that "the protection of water rights and contract rights to the use of water is in
the public interest and is necessary to facilitate the voluntary transfer of water in
California." These declarations largely reiterate existing law.123
In addition, section 101 contains several other declarations of policy that
focus on some of the specific provisions of the Model Act. These include: a
statement of the importance of protecting the rights and interests of third
parties who may be adversely affected by otherwise beneficial transfers;
recognition of the important role that local water agencies play in the water
transfer process; and an emphasis of the need for other legal changes proposed
in the Model Act, such as revision of the law governing the State Water
Resources Control Board's review of water transfers within its statutory
jurisdiction, authorization of expedited transfers of conserved and salvaged
water, improvement of the processes for transferring water to instream uses,
authorization of regional water banks, and clarification of the relationship
between the water transfer laws and the California Environmental Quality Act.
Section 102 continues with a statement of the purposes of the Model Act.
These purposes are listed in the sequence in which they appear in the Model
Act, and Section 102 therefore provides a useful outline to the Act itself.
Finally, section 103 provides a working title for the Model Act—the
"California Water Transfer Act."
Part B:

General Authority

Part B is something of a potpourri. It contains nine discrete sections, each of
which addresses subjects that apply to subsequent Parts of the Model Act. For
example, section 201 delimits the coverage of the Act and defines the terms "water
transfers" and "transfers of water" as they are used throughout the Act. Section 208
set forth general rules for governing the use of groundwater to replace surface
water that is transferred. And, section 209 articulates several important changes to
the California Environmental Quality Act. These rules would apply to all water

122.

Article X, Section 2, of the California Constitution provides in relevant part:
The right to water or to the use or flow of water in or from any natural stream or
water course in this State is and shall be limited to such water as shall be
reasonably required for the beneficial use to be served, and such right does
not and shall not extend to the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable
method of use or unreasonable method of diversion of water. Riparian rights
in a stream or water course attach to, but to no more than so much of the flow
thereof as may be required or used consistently with this section, for the
purposes for which such lands are, or may be made adaptable, in view of such
reasonable and beneficial uses...

CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2. For an analysis of Article X, Section 2, see Gray, supra note 38, at 253-72.
123.

See e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 109, 475 (West 1996).
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transfers, not simply to those regulated by the procedures and standards set forth
in Parts D and E of the Model Act. Thus, an understanding of Part B is essential to
an understanding of the Model Act as a whole.
As just noted, section 201 defines the coverage of the Model Act. It states
that the Act applies to three types of transactions:
1.
Voluntary changes in surface water rights that do not involve a transfer of water from
the existing water right holder to another user. This category includes changes
in water rights where the water right holder needs to alter the place of
use or purpose of use set forth in its existing permit or license,
for
example, but does not wish to transfer water to another user.
2.
Voluntary changes in surface water rights that do involve a transfer of water from the
existing water right holder to another user. This category includes
water
transfers that may be accomplished only by an accompanying change
in the transferor's permit or license. These types of transfers currently
are governed by sections 1700 through 1705.5 of the Water Code.124
3. Voluntary transfers of water that do not require a change in water rights. This
category includes transfers that may be accomplished without
changing a water right. Transfers between members of an irrigation
district that holds appropriative rights and transfers between State
Water Project Contractors would be examples of this category.125
For simplicity, section 201 states that, as used throughout the Model Act, the
terms "water transfers" and "transfers of water" include voluntary changes in
surface water rights, voluntary transfers of surface water rights, and voluntary
transfers of water.
It is important to emphasize, as does section 201, that the Model Act applies
only to voluntary changes in water rights and voluntary transfers of water. Moreover,
except for section 208, the Model Act applies only to changes in surface water rights
and transfers of water based on surface water rights. As described in more detail
below, section 208 addresses only the substitution of groundwater for transferred
surface water. This subject is governed by existing statutory law.126
Finally, the Model Act applies only to certain types of changes in surface
water rights or transfers of water based on surface water rights. It does not apply
at all to pueblo rights and governs changes in riparian rights only as provided in
section 207. This section restates the existing statutory authorization of
transfers of quantified riparian rights127 and would codify the practice approved
during the 1991 Water Bank of allowing riparians to forego the exercise of their
water rights without formally transferring the water made available by such
forbearance.128 Moreover, as discussed above, the general water transfer
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See Gray, supra note 26, at 779-80.
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CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1011.5, 1745.10, 1745.11 (West 1996).
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Id. § 1740.
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See Gray, supra note 36, at 29-31.
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procedures and standards of Part D and the expedited rules governing transfers
of conserved water under Part E apply on a mandatory basis only to transfers of
water that require a change in the term of a permit or license within the existing
statutory jurisdiction of the State Water Resources Control Board.
Section 202 is considerably more simple. It declares that surface water
rights and surface water, as defined in section 201, may be transferred in
according with the provisions of the Act.
Section 203 then defines in broad terms the types of legal arrangements
that qualify as water transfer agreements. Legal agreements include "purchase
and sales contracts, deeds, leases, exchange agreements, options, futures
contracts, subordination agreements, gifts, agreements to forego the use of
water, and other types of arrangements to transfer water that are mutually
agreeable to the parties." A number of observers have recognized the
importance of affording the parties to water transfers substantial freedom to
define the structure of, and terms by which, they agree to transfer water.129 This
section would authorize such parties to enter into any type of contractual
arrangement that they believe would best serve their interests, subject of course
to compliance with the requirements of the Model Act and other applicable law.
Section 204 distinguishes between short-term and long-term transfers. It
defines short-term transfers as "proposals or agreements the term of which is
two years or less." Long-term transfers are "proposals or agreements the term of
which is greater than two years." Long-term proposals and agreements include
permanent changes in water rights and permanent transfers of water. To take
into account the possibility that the parties to a water transfer might seek to
avoid the requirements applicable to long-term transfers by stringing together a
series of short-term transfer agreements, section 204 also provides:
If a water right holder or water transferor enters into
successive short-term agreements with the same party (or
agents, representatives, subcontractors, assignees, or
beneficiaries of the same party), and such successive
agreements have commencement dates within two years of
each other and result in the transfer of water for a term in
excess of three years, the agreements shall be regarded as a
long-term agreement and the provisions of this Act governing
long-term agreements shall apply to the second agreement
and any successive agreements.
The definition of short-term and long-term transfers by reference to the
term of the proposal or agreement is significant, because this section would
define as long-term any arrangement by which water is regularly transferred
throughout the terms of an agreement greater than two years in length and any

129. See e.g., Steven J. Shupe, Gary D. Weatherford & Elizabeth Checchio, Western Water
Rights: The Era of Reallocation, 29 NAT. RES. J. 413, 419-22 (1989).
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arrangement for the sporadic, limited time transfer of water over the course of
an agreement of longer than two years duration. Thus, a ten-year "dry year
option" agreement-pursuant to which the transferee has the right to receive
water from the transferor during dry and critical water years—would be regarded
as a long-term agreement, even though water may be physically transferred only
for two or three months at any given time during the term of the agreement.
The distinction between short-term and long-term transfers is an
acknowledgement that certain legal restrictions should not apply to transfers of limited
duration because the harm that might occur to third party interests from short-term
transfers would be temporary and therefore reparable. In contrast, third-parties could be
irremediably injured by long-term transfers unless their interests are considered at the
outset before water is transferred on a long-term or permanent basis.
The Model Act distinguishes between short-term and long-term transfers
in five places:
1.Section 209 categorically exempts short-term water transfer proposals
and agreements from the environmental review requirements of the
California Environmental Quality Act. This exemption is based on
existing law.130
2.Section 403(g) provides that the State Water Resources Control Board
may consider short-term transfer petitions within its jurisdiction
without conducting a live hearing, which is mandatory in the case of
long-term transfers.
3.Sections 404(a) and 404(b) assign to the transferor the burden of proving
that the transfer of water pursuant to a long-term transfer agreement
would not "result in significant injury to any legal user of water" or
"unreasonably affect fish, wildlife, or other instream beneficial uses."
In contrast, for short-term transfer agreements, the transferor would
simply have the burden of producing prima facie evidence of
compliance with these protections for third parties. Once the
transferor produced such evidence, the burden of proof would shift to
persons opposed to the transfer to prove that the short-term transfer
would cause significant harm to other legal water users or would
unreasonably affect fish, wildlife, or other instream beneficial uses.
4.Section 404(c) applies to an additional substantive criterion to longterm agreements to transfer water that are based on the fallowing or
retirement of previously irrigated land. In these cases, the State
Water Resources Control Board would have to find that the longterm transfer would also not "cause substantial harm to the
economy in the area from which the water is to be transferred."
5.Section 507 provides that long-term transfer of water made available by
land-fallowing or retirement are not eligible for the expedited
transfer provisions of Part E.

130.
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Only the first of these provisions—the exemption from CEQA—would apply to
all types of water transfers. The second, third, and fourth are relevant only to
transfers that are subject to the jurisdiction of the State Water Resources
Control Board according to the provisions of Part D, and the fifth applies only to
expedited transfers of conserved water pursuant to Part E.
Section 204 changes existing law, which uses one year as the dividing
point between short-term and long-term transfers.131 There was a broad
consensus among participants in the focus groups that the present definition of
short-term transfers as one year or less is overly restrictive, because it leaves too
little time to implement short-term transfer arrangements.
Section 205 simply codifies the well established legal requirement that,
during the term of all water transfers, the parties must comply with other
applicable state and federal laws. These laws include: Article X, Section 2 of the
California Constitution, sections 1410-1418 of the California Civil Code, which
govern pre-1914 appropriative rights acquired pursuant to the Civil Code of
1872; other provisions of the Water Code; the terms and conditions of the
transferor's and transferee's water rights permits or licenses; and other judicial
and administrative decisions respecting water rights, water quality, and other
beneficial uses.
Section 206 addresses transfers of water within or through the
Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. It has been the practice of the State Water
Resources Control Board to require such transfers to meet two requirements.
First, the transferor must contribute water for salinity repulsion and other water
quality requirements as determined by the Board. Second, the transfer must
include a "carriage water" component that represents the water "lost" to the
system when water is moved across the Delta. Indeed, this practice has now
been codified as a section of the Water Code applicable to "water leases."132
A number of participants in the focus groups objected to the Board's
assertion of authority to take a portion of water transferred through the Delta for
salinity control and other water quality requirements in addition to those set
forth in the Water Quality Control Plan for the Bay-Delta. Other participants
challenged the carriage water requirements, questioning whether any water was
lost during transport through the Delta.
The Model Act responds to these issues in two ways. The first paragraph of
section 206 states simply that no transfer of water within or through the Delta
"shall cause a violation of the water quality standards (including flow
requirements and temperature standards) applicable to the Delta as established
under state and federal law." This approach is consistent with transfers that they
not alter the status quo in a way that causes a violation of water quality standards
or creates injury to fish, wildlife, and other instream beneficial uses. To answer
the concern that, at least for some transfers, no carriage water is needed to

131.

Id. §§ 1728, 1735.

132.

Id. § 1027.
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move water through the Delta, the second and third paragraphs of section 206
would require the Board to address this question by rulemaking. If the Board
determines that carriage water is required, it would have to include in the
regulations "a table that states the additional amount of carriage water that
must accompany each transfer of water within or through the Delta for various
hydrologic conditions and types of transfers."
Section 207, as noted previously, is the only provision of the Model Act
that addressed riparian rights. It does so in two ways. First, section 207
authorizes the transfer of riparian rights that have been quantified in a statutory
adjudication to be transferred as though they are appropriative rights. This is a
restatement of current Water Code section 1740.
Second, section 207 allows riparians voluntarily to forego the exercise of their
riparian rights for the benefit of another party. In such cases, there is no transfer of
water. As a legal matter, the water returns to the river system where it may be claimed
by other riparians or appropriated by other lawful water users. As a practical matter,
however, the water may be used by the "purchasing party" to meet its own water
quality and instream flow obligations. This in turn may make other water owned or
controlled by the "purchasing party" available for other consumptive uses. In 1991, the
Department of Water Resources entered into forbearance arrangements with riparians
along the lower Sacramento River and in the Delta. The Department used the
"acquired" water to meet its Delta water quality requirements, which freed other water
in its system for distribution to its own contractors and to customers of the Water
Bank.133 This was an important and effective strategy. Accordingly, section 207 also
preserves the authority of riparians to enter into similar agreements to forego the
exercise of their riparian rights.
Section 208 defines the circumstances under which a transferor of surface
water may initiate or increase its use of groundwater to replace surface water
that it transfers out-of-basin. A transferor of surface water generally may replace
the transferred surface water with groundwater if three conditions are satisfied.
First, the transferor must have legal authority to use groundwater and may not
exceed his or her groundwater rights under state and local law. Second, the
transferor's use of groundwater must be consistent with all valid laws that
govern the extraction, appropriation, and use of groundwater, including
groundwater management statutes, local groundwater management plans
adopted pursuant to sections 10750 through 10755.4 of the Water Code, city or
county ordinances, judicial decisions and decrees, and the provisions on CEQA.
Third, the transferor's use of groundwater may not cause the long-term
operating safe yield of the groundwater basin to be exceeded.134

133. For a description and analysis of this aspect of the 1991 Water Bank, including
an explanation of how DWR calculated the quantity of water returned to the river by virtue of
the riparians' forbearance of use, see Gray, supra note 36, at 29-31.
134. The Model Act also states that local groundwater management plans and
ordinances may not prohibit the use of groundwater to replace surface water except as
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Special provisions govern groundwater substitution to replace surface
water exported from "basin subject to critical conditions of overdraft" as defined
in the Department of Water Resources' Bulletin 118 Series. Section 208
prohibits the substitution of groundwater in these circumstances, unless the
groundwater previously was "stored for the purpose of subsequent extraction for
surface water replacement or direct transfer as part of a groundwater banking
program carried out by direct recharge, delivery of surface water in lieu of
groundwater pumping, or by other means." The groundwater basins that
currently would be covered by this restriction are: the Santa Cruz-Pajaro basin;
the Cuyuma Valley basin; the Ventura County basin; the Eastern San Joaquin
County basin; and the Chowchilla, Madera, Kings, Kaweah, Tulare Lake, Tule,
and Kern County basins.135 The list of groundwater basins protected by this
export prohibition would change as DWR updates the Bulletin 118 Series.
Finally, section 209 concludes Part B with a clarification of the
applicability of the environmental review requirements of the California
Environmental Quality Act to water transfers. It states that CEQA shall not apply
to short-term transfer agreements. This exemption is based on current law.136
Part C:

Protection of Water Rights

Part C is comprised of four sections that expand on the existing legal
protections for water rights in the context of water transfers. As noted
previously, the Water Code presently authorizes transfers of conserved and
surplus water and declares that the transfer of water shall be deemed a
beneficial use by the transferor.137 The purpose of these laws is to create
incentives to water right holders and other water users to conserve and transfer
water and to provide assurances to potential transferees that the water they may
acquire will be secure throughout the term of the transfer agreement.138 Despite
these protections, many of the participants in the focus groups expressed the
concern that existing law does not adequately protect the rights of the parties to
water transfer agreements and that legal changes are needed to create the
security of property rights required in any market-based allocational system. The
provisions of Part C are a response to these concerns. Because questions about
water rights arise in virtually every type of water transfer, the protections set
forth in Part C would apply to all water transfers, not simply to those governed
by Parts D and E of the Model Act.

necessary to ensure that the long-term operating safe yield of the aquifer is not exceeded as
a result of the conjunctive use arrangement.
135.

CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, supra note 111, at 4.

136.

CAL. WATER CODE § 1729 (West 1996).
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Id. §§ 1011(b), 1244, 1745.07.
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See Gray, supra note 38, at 275-77.
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Section 301 protects the water rights of the transferor. It states that the
transferor's "offer of water for transfer, the transfer negotiations, and the
agreement to transfer water shall not be used as evidence of the transferor's
waste or unreasonable use, or cessation of use, of the water made available for
transfer." Section 301 also provides that the transfer of water or water rights
shall not "cause, or be the basis of, a forfeiture or abandonment of any water
rights, contract rights, or other right to use water." These declarations are based
on existing sections 1011(b), 1024, 1244, 1745.07 of the Water Code.
Section 302 continues these protections during the term of the agreement
to transfer water. It provides that, throughout the term of all water transfer
agreements, compliance with Article X, Section 2 of the California Constitution
and other laws governing waste and unreasonable use "shall be determined
based on an assessment of the reasonableness of the transferee's use of the
transferred water." The purpose of section 302 is to assure both parties to the
transfer that the transferor's alleged prior waste, unreasonable use, or non-use
will not be a basis for reduction or divestment of the rights to the transferred
water during the term of the transfer agreement. As described supra Part I, this
section would codify the practice employed by the State Water Resources
Control Board with respect to the Imperial Irrigation District's transfer of
conserved water to the Metropolitan Water District.
Section 303 follows by clarifying the rights of transferors at the conclusion
of the term of water transfer agreements. Participants in all of the focus groups
stated that the current laws do not adequately protect the rights of transferors at
this stage of the transfer process, and consequently some users are deterred
from transferring water because they fear that they will not regain the rights to
such water at the end of the transfer agreement. Section 303 addressed these
concerns by declaring that "at the conclusion of the term of a water transfer
agreement, all rights in, and to the use of, the water subject to the transfer
agreement shall revert back to the transferor." For additional emphasis, it then
stipulates that "neither the transferee [nor] any beneficiary of the transfer claim
any right to a continued supply of water based on reliance, estoppel, intervening
public use, water shortage emergency, unforeseen or unforeseeable increases in
demand, or any other cause." Section 303 provides the strongest possible legal
protections for transferors at the conclusion of the term of water transfers.
Finally, section 304 states that the "conservation, salvage, or other
reduction in the use of water for the purpose of transferring shall be deemed a
reasonable and beneficial use of water." This language is simply a restatement
of existing law.139
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General Standards and Procedures Governing the Transfer of
Water

Part D articulates the general rules applicable to water transfers governed
by the Model Act.
Section 401 states that, with the exception of expedited transfers of
conserved water governed by Part E, all transfers of water must comply with the
requirements of Part D. This broad statement of coverage is limited, however, by
the terms of section 402, which make clear that the central provisions of Part
D—the transfer procedures of section 403 and the transfer standards of section
404—apply on a mandatory basis only to transfers that necessitate a change in
the term of a permit of license subject to the current statutory jurisdiction of the
State Water Resources Control Board.
Section 402 thus defines the scope of the Board's jurisdiction under Part
D. It states that the Board shall review all petitions to transfer water
appropriated under permit or license and petitions to transfer quantified
riparian rights "where the transfer requires an alteration of the purpose of use,
place or use, point of diversion, point of return flow, or any other term or
condition of the water right as set forth in the applicable permit, license, or
decree." This does not expand the Board's mandatory jurisdiction as defined in
the existing water transfer laws.140 Indeed, to emphasize this point, section 402
also stipulates that the Board "shall not have jurisdiction over any other
transfers of water unless the water right holder requests the Board to exercise
jurisdiction pursuant to sections 403 and 404."
Section 403 sets forth the procedures that would govern the Board's
review of petitions to transfer water. Petitions may be filed by the water right
holder and, with the water right holder's permission, by a contractor or user
supplied directly or indirectly by the water right holder. The balance of section
403 defines the process by which transfer petitions are reviewed by the Board.
These procedures are a consolidation and improvement of the existing transfer
review procedures.141 Important changes from the current law include:
imposition of specific time limits on the Board's exercise of its investigation,
review, and decisionmaking responsibilities; and exemption of short-term
transfer petitions from the hearing requirements of current law. Section 403 also
provides for judicial review of the Board's decision to grant or to deny transfer
petitions. A court could overturn a decision by the Board only for procedural
errors, for statutory or constitutional violations, or if the court found that the
decision was not supported by substantial evidence. A court would have no
authority to award damages or any other type of monetary relief.
Section 404 follows with an articulation of the substantive standards that
would govern the Board's decision on water transfer petitions. As described

140.

Id. §§ 1701,1725, 1735.

141.

See id. §§ 1700-1705.5, 1725-1732, 1735-1737.
671

West

Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008

earlier, this section was the result of comments received from participants in the
focus groups that the Model Act should create a hierarchy of types of transfers
that are likely not to result in significant injuries to third parties, while
subjecting transfers that have greater potential for third party harm to greater
scrutiny. To accomplish this salutary goal, section 404 delineates three
categories of transfers and would require the Board to apply different legal
standards in its review of transfer petitions for each of these categories.
Section 404(a) applies to short-term transfers—i.e., proposals and
agreements the term of which is two years or less. It states that the Board shall
approve a short-term transfer petition "unless it concludes that the proposed
transfer: (1) would result in significant injury to any legal user of water; or (2)
would unreasonably affect fish, wildlife, or other instream beneficial uses." The
petitioner would have the burden of producing prima facie evidence that the
proposed transfer would comply with these two requirements. The
establishment of a prima facie case then would shift the burden of proof to the
parties that filed protests in accordance with the requirements of section 403.
The protestants would have to prove that the proposed transfer would not
comply with the standards of this subsection.
Section 404(b) addresses long-term transfers—i.e., proposals and
agreements the term of which is greater than two years. It provides that the
Board shall not approve a long-term transfer petition unless it concludes that
the proposed transfer: (1) would not result in significant injury to any legal water
user; and (2) would not unreasonably affect fish, wildlife, or other instream
beneficial uses. For long-term transfers, the burden of proof would remain on
the petitioner throughout the proceedings.
Section 404(c) creates an additional substantive requirement for long-term
transfers based on the fallowing or retirement of previously irrigated land that
would change the place of use or transfer the water to uses outside the county or
counties in which the water previously has been used. In addition to the standards
of section 404(b), the Board could not approve a petition for this type of transfer if
it concluded that "the proposed transfer would cause substantial harm to the
economy in the area from which the water is to be transferred." In making this
determination, the Board would be required to "consider any actions that the
petitioner or other parties to the transfer agreement have taken to mitigate harm
to the economy in the area from which the water is to be transferred." Section
404(c) assigns the burden of proof to the petitioner. The substantive protection for
local economies would not apply to long-term water transfers based on the
fallowing or retirement of irrigated land within the San Joaquin Valley Drainage
Program study area that the Board concludes "would contribute to the reduction
of agricultural drainage that causes injury to land and natural resources or
adversely affect surface water or groundwater quality." This exemption was
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included specifically to facilitate the retirement of land within the drainage
problem area of the western San Joaquin Valley.142
To the extent that a transfer petition includes water that would be
consumed by the transferor in the absence of the proposed transfer, section
404(d) would allow the Board to use the quantification processes of Part E to
calculate the amount of such water available for transfer. The Board would apply
a rebuttable presumption that the transfer of this water would not result in
significant injury to any legal user of water or unreasonably affect fish, wildlife,
or other instream beneficial uses.
Section 404(e) states that, if the Board "determines that both the release
of water for transfer and the diversion or rediversion of the transferred water
would comply with the terms and conditions of existing permits and licenses
that protect other legal water users, fish, wildlife, and other instream beneficial
uses affected by the appropriation and use of the water that is the subject of the
petition," then the Board shall conclude that the proposed transfer would
comply with the requirements of sections 404(a) and 404(b). Section 404(f)
complements this provision with the requirements by directing the Board only
to consider the effect of the proposed transfer on the third party interests
protected by section 404. The Board may not deny, or place conditions on its
approval of, a water transfer in order to mitigate adverse effects on fish, wildlife,
or other instream beneficial uses, or to mitigate harm to the economy in the
area from which the water is to be transferred, that would be caused by factors
other than the proposed water transfer. The purpose of these sections is to
ensure that the Board does not impose on the parties to water transfers the
burden of correcting environmental or economic problems caused by factors
beyond the parties' control
Section 404(g) declares that, in all cases, the petitioner has the burden of
proving that it has valid water rights to the water included in the transfer
petition. The burden of proof on all of the substantive standards set out in
section 404 would be by a preponderance of the evidence.
Section 405 establishes brief notice requirements for water transfers that are
not subject to the Board's jurisdiction under sections 403 and 404. Thus, it would
apply to transfers of pre-1914 appropriative rights that involve a change in the
purpose of use, place of use, point of diversion, or point of return flow from that of
the existing use. In such cases, section 405 simply would require the water right
holder to provide notice and a brief explanation of the changes to the Board, the
Department of Fish and Game, and the Supervisors of the county or counties from
which the water is to be transferred. Section 405 would not authorize the Board to
review or otherwise have jurisdiction over these transfers.
Section 406 provides a segue to Part E by allowing the petitioner to use
the expedited procedures for transfers of conserved water for any portion of the
petition that qualifies under Part E.
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Part E:

Standards and Procedures for Expedited Transfers of
Conserved Water

As described above, one of the central features of the Model Act is the
creation of an expedited process for transfers of water conserved or salvaged by the
transferor. This expedited process would improve California's water transfer laws,
because it would allow transfers of conserved and salvaged water to occur relatively
quickly, without substantive review by the State Water Resources Control Board, but
subject to categorical protections for third party interests. The standards and
procedures that would govern expedited transfers are set forth in Part E.
Section 501 defines "conserved water" that may be transferred on an
expedited basis as "water that: (1) the transferor is legally entitled to use during the
term of the transfer agreement pursuant to existing water rights, contracts, or other
legal authority; and (2) the transferor has used within the five years immediately
preceding the transfer agreement." This definition is designed to ensure that the
transferor has rights to and would have used the water proposed for transfer if the
transfer did not occur—i.e., that transfers under part E are limited to transfers of
"wet water." The requirement that the transferor have used the water within five
years is based on the five-year period for forfeiture of appropriative rights for nonuse.143 Section 501 also gives examples of conserved water, including: water that the
transferor conserves through salvage of water irretrievably lost to all consumptive
uses during storage, transportation, or distribution; increased efficiency of irrigation
or other use; changes in the acreage or type of crop irrigated; land fallowing or
retirement; changes in operations; reduction in demand within the transferor's place
of use or service area; substitution of reclaimed or recycled water; pricing changes;
and other conservation measures.
Section 502 then defines the quantity of conserved water that may be
transferred under the expedited procedures. It provides:
Transfers of conserved water shall not exceed, for any water
accounting year during the term of transfer, the lesser of: (1)
the amount of water that is legally and physically available to
the transferor during the water year; or (2) the average annual
quantity of water consumed by the transferor, or irretrievably
lost to all consumptive uses, during the ten water years
immediately preceding the transfer.
The purpose of this section is to create the categorical protection for third party
interests described above. By limiting the quantity of transferable water to the
lesser of the amount physically available to the transferor or the average
consumptive use plus irretrievable losses, section 502 ensures that additional
water within the transferor's appropriative rights on which third parties may rely
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will remain available to them after the consumptive use and irretrievable loss
component is transferred. Thus, the definition of transferable quantities
contained in section 502 protects other legal water users who use the
transferor's surface runoff or appropriate the transferor's return flow,
groundwater users who have rights to the percolating waters produced by the
transferor's existing irrigation practices, and wetlands and instream uses of the
surface runoff and return flow from the transferor's current practices.
Section 503 establishes the process by which the conserved water
available for transfer is quantified. Different quantification methods apply
depending on the source of the conserved water:
1.
For transfers of water previously used by the transferor for
irrigation, and conserved by crop substitution or land
fallowing, the transferable quantity would be determined by
reference to a "Water Consumption Table for California
Agriculture." This Table would be promulgated by the Board
and would contain a calculation of the water consumed in the
irrigation of each crop grown in California. The Table would
contain separate water consumption data per crop for each
hydrologic region of the state.
2.
For transfers of water previously used by the transferor for
any other purpose, and conserved by changes in the
efficiency of use, salvage of water irretrievably lost to all
other consumptive uses, use of reclaimed or recycled
water, pricing changes, reduction in demand, or other
methods of conservation, the transferable quantity would
be determined by the actual water consumption data.
The purpose of using generic tables for the first category of transfers, rather
than real water consumption data, is to expedite the transfer process by relieving
both the parties to the transfer and the Board of the difficult and expensive task of
calculating the transferor's actual historic water consumption during the years
preceding the transfer. Because of the multiplicity of ways of conserving water
through changes in the efficiency of use, and the consequent impossibility of
formulating generic water conservation tables, transfers in the second category
would have to be calculated on the basis of actual water savings.
Section 504 sets forth the expedited procedures applicable to transfers of
conserved water pursuant to Part E. The transferor would be required to submit to the
State Water Resources Control Board its calculation of the amount of conserved water
that it proposes to transfer and to provide notice of the proposal to the Department of
Fish and Game and to the Supervisors of the county or counties from which the water
will be transferred. The Board would not have authority to review the proposal as it
would transfer petitions filed under Part D. Rather, the Board simply would review the
transferor's calculation of the quantity of conserved water available for transfer to ensure
that the quantification complied with the requirements of sections 502 and 503. If the
Board approved the calculations, it would issue a "Certificate of Transfer" to the
transferor. This document would provide full legal authorization for the transfer, and the

675

West

Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008

transfer would not otherwise be subject to review by the Board or by the courts. If the
Board rejected the transferor's calculations, the transferor either could accept the Board's
alternative quantification or could petition for judicial review. The courts would review
the Board's decision under the substantial evidence standard, but would have no
authority to award damages or other monetary relief.
At the suggestion of the State Water Resources Control Board, section 504
also contains a disclaimer that the Board's issuance of a Certificate of Transfer does
not constitute "a determination or quantification of the water rights of the transferor
or of the rights to use water by the transferor or any other person, except for the
purpose of authorizing the transfer of conserved water pursuant to this section."
The remaining sections of Part E provide backup protections for third parties in
the event that the categorical protections described above fail in individual cases.
These backup protections are essential, because third parties would not have the right
to protest or to seek judicial review of expedited transfers before they occur. Thus, if
the categorical protections were to fail, injured third parties must have some means of
obtaining compensation. The security requirements of section 505 and the
compensation system of section 506 are designed to achieve this purpose. They would
apply exclusively to expedited transfer undertaken pursuant to Part E.
Section 505 would require every person or entity that acquires transferred water
under Part E to post security in the amount of $5.00 per acre-foot of transferred water.
The security could be in the form of a cash deposit, money order, certified check, of
bond payable to the State Water Resources Control Board. Transfers between users
located in the same local water agency and Delta carriage water provided under
section 206 of the Model Act would be exempt from the security requirements. The
security would guarantee the parties' performance of the transfer without injury to the
rights of third parties. If the transfer caused injury to certain third parties, they would
have the right to seek compensation from the proceeds of the security deposited with
the Board in accordance with the standards of section 506.
Section 506 creates the compensation system for claims on the security
interests posted under section 505. Eligible claimants are limited to:
(1) the Department of Fish and Game, which may seek compensation
on behalf of the public for "reduction in water quality or flows and
diminution in water quality caused by the transfer that adversely
affects fish and wildlife, recreation, other instream uses, aquatic and
riparian habitat, or wetlands;"
(2) the county or counties from which water is transferred, which may
seek compensation for loss of tax revenues and increased social
services costs caused by the transfer; and
(3) other legal water users, who may seek compensation for "reduction
in the supply of water that the claimant is legally entitled to use,
diminution of water quality that adversely affects the claimant's
water use, and increased pumping costs caused by the transfer."
Claims for compensation would be subject to binding arbitration. To
prevail on the merits, the claimant would have to prove that the injuries were
caused by the expedited transfer and not by other factors such as
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drought or other water shortages; changes in the operation of
water facilities not controlled by the parties to the transfer;
changes in river flows, groundwater extraction, or groundwater
recharge not related to the transfer; changes in commodities
prices, cost of goods and services, or labor costs; changes in the
general economic conditions of the region; and other hydrologic
and economic conditions not related to the transfer.
The arbitrator would be appointed by the State Water Resources Control Board
and would have authority to award monetary damages up to the amount of the
security posted under section 505.
Section 507 completes Part E. It addresses concerns raised in the focus
groups by representatives of rural communities and small farmers that it would be
inappropriate to allow expedited transfers of water in situations that could cause
significant economic harm to the area from which the water would be transferred.
Thus, section 507 provides that the expedited procedures of Part E do not apply to
long-term agreements to transfer conserved water that (1) would obtain water for
transfer by fallowing or retirement of land previously used for agricultural purposes
and (2) would transfer the water to uses outside the county or counties in which the
water was used before the transfer occurred. To allow opponents of these types of
transfers to express their objections, section 507 mandates that they be subject to
review by the Board in accordance with the provisions of Part D.
Part F:

Transfers of Water to Instream Uses

The Water code presently allows existing water right holders to dedicate
all or a portion of their rights to instream uses.144 The three sections that
comprise Part F incorporate this statute and address an important question left
unanswered by the existing law.
Section 601 simple restates the current law and authorizes water right
holders and other legal users of water to transfer their water to instream uses.
These transfers would be governed by the general transfer rules of Part D or, in
appropriate cases, by the expedited transfer provisions of Part E.
As discussed above, environmentalists and other proponents of instream
water rights have questioned whether the State Water Resources Control Board and
other agencies with jurisdiction over water quality and instream flow protection
could claim water dedicated to instream water rights as part of the water needed to
comply with the regulatory standards. They have worried that these agencies might
reduce the quantity of water or flows required to meet the regulatory standards by
an amount equal to the quantity or flows dedicated to instream uses in the form of
instream water rights. This absorption of the instream water rights would effectively
defeat the purpose of the instream dedication.145
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Section 602 addresses this concern by declaring that water transferred to
instream uses shall be in addition to water devoted to instream uses pursuant to
federal, state, or local regulatory requirements. This would prevent the Board and
other agencies from including in their calculation of the amount of water or flows
needed to meet water quality standards or minimum stream flow requirements any
water dedicated or transferred to instream uses and held in the form of an instream
water right. Section 602 therefore would ensure that water that is transferred to
instream uses under section 601 would augment any water devoted to water quality
or instream flow standards through the regulatory system.
Section 603 was added at the suggestion of several participants in the
focus groups. It provides that, if the transferor chooses to use the water
dedicated to instream uses for the purpose of satisfying its obligations under
such regulatory standards, the dedicated water shall be credited toward the
transferor's regulatory duties.
Part G:

Water Transfer Fees

Participants in several of the focus groups questioned whether the State
Water Resources Control Board would have adequate resources to discharge the
responsibilities assigned to it by Parts D and E of the Model Act. They suggested
that a nominal water transfer fee be established to provide funding to support
the Board's review of water transfers that fall within its statutory jurisdiction.
This idea received broad support among the other focus groups. Part G was
drafted in response to this recommendation.
Section 701 requires every person or entity that acquires water transferred
pursuant to Parts D and E to pay a water transfer fee. For transfers governed by Part
D, this fee applies only to those over which the Board exercises jurisdiction pursuant
to section 403 and 404. Thus, it does not apply to transfers of water appropriated
pursuant to pre-1914 rights or to transfers of water appropriated under permit or
license that do not require an amendment of the permit or license and that are not
submitted to the Board for review. Transfers to instream uses under Part F also are
exempt from the transfer fee. Moreover, the fee does not apply to carriage water
required for through-Delta transfers as set forth in section 206.
Section 702 directs the Board to promulgate a "Water Transfer Fee Schedule"
by regulation. In recognition of the likely economies of scale associated with the
cost of the Board's review of larger transfers, the amount of the transfer fee declines
as the quantity of water proposed for transfer increases. The fees for expedited
transfers undertaken pursuant to Part E are less than the fees for transfers governed
by Part D, because the expenses incurred by the Board in checking the transferor's
quantification of conserved water available for transfer under Part E likely would be
substantially less than the costs of review under Part D. Section 702 directs the
Board to set the fees at levels that are adequate, but no greater than necessary, to
pay for the costs of administration of Parts D and E. It also establishes a schedule of
maximum fees that the Board could not exceed.
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Section 703 authorizes the Board to use the proceeds of the water transfer fees
to implement the requirements of Parts D and E. This section also permits the Board
to use any residual proceeds to support its other administrative responsibilities.
Section 704 is designed to ensure that the water transfer fees would be a
permanent source of funding to pay for the Board's administration of the water transfer
laws. Thus, it prohibits the state from including the proceeds of the fees as party of the
general state budget and from using the fees to meet general state obligations.
Part H: Authority of Local Water Agencies
Part H addresses four related topics: (1) the authority of local water agencies to
transfer water; (2) the authority of members and customers of local agencies to
transfer water; (3) the authority of local water agencies to receive transferred water; and
(4) the authority of members and customers of local agencies to receive transferred
water. As discussed in detail above, Part H reflects a variety of significant changes from
earlier drafts based on comments received from the focus groups.
Section 801 provides general authority to local water agencies to transfer
water to purchasers located outside the agency's existing service area.
Subsection 801(a) would allow the agency to transfer water to which the agency
has water rights or contract rights that is in excess of the reasonable and
beneficial demands of its members and customers and water that is made
available for transfer by conservation measures undertaken or funded by the
agency. Subsection 801(b) would permit local agencies to transfer water for the
benefit of individual members or customers who ask the agency to transfer the
water on their behalf. These provisions are reiterative of existing law.146
There are two important limitations on agency authority to transfer water.
First, subsection 801(a) provides:
Without the consent of the member or customer, the agency
shall not declare as "excess" water that a member or customer
of the agency has authority to use, or to transfer pursuant to
section 802, during the term of the transfer proposed by the
agency, if the member or customer has applied the same
quantity of water to a beneficial use, or has transferred the
same quantity of water pursuant to the provisions of section
802, at least once during the preceding five years.
The purpose of this caveat is to prevent local agencies from claiming water to which a
member or customer has an individual entitlement and which the member or
customer seeks to transfer to a purchaser located within or outside the agency.
Second, subsection 801(c) stipulates that local agencies may not transfer or claim
water to which an individual member or customer holds water rights or contract
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rights with a party other than the agency. The purpose of this restriction is to protect
the rights of members or customers to water that is not supplied by the agency and
over which the agency should not exercise decisionmaking authority.
Section 802 provides simply that members and customers of local water
agencies may transfer water with the approval of the agency and that the
financial terms and operational conditions of such transfers shall be established
by agreement between the agency and the participating members or customers.
As described above, this section recognizes the authority that local agencies
possess under existing law to decide how water that they control and distribute
to their members and customers may be used.
Section 803 complements section 801 by authorizing local water agencies
to acquire transferred water for distribution to their members and customers, on
behalf of their members and customers, and for other reasonable and beneficial
uses. This section would not change existing law.
Section 804 is the counterpart to section 802. It authorizes members and
customers of local water agencies to acquire transferred water from sources
other than the agency. If the transfer would not require the use of the agency's
water supply system, the agency would have no authority over the transfer. If the
transfer would require use of the agency's system, the terms of the transfer
would be subject to the rules governing "wheeling" set forth in Part I.
Section 805 defines the term "local water agency" for purposes of Part H.
Local water agencies include all public and private entities that provide water
service in California. The provisions of Part H are not applicable, however, to the
United States Bureau of Reclamation, the Army Corps of Engineers, or the
California Department of Water Resources.
Part I:

Wheeling

Part I addresses the topic of "wheeling"—the use of water supply facilities
by someone other than the owner or operator to transport water. The wheeling
rules apply both to the use of water supply systems by members and customers
of the agency that owns the system and to the use of water supply systems by
nonmembers. Part I is based on the wheeling provisions of existing law.147
Section 901(a) authorizes any legal water user who transfers water or who
receives transferred water to use up to seventy percent of the "unused capacity"
of water supply systems owned or operated by public water supply agencies to
transport the water. The seventy percent limitation is taken from the current law
and is designed to provide public agencies with a "buffer" to ensure that they
retain sufficient capacity to meet their own future water transportation needs
during the term of wheeling arrangements under Part I.148
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Section 901(a) also states that the legal water user shall have the right to wheel
water through the agency's water supply system throughout the term of the water
transfer agreement. This is an important clarification of existing law, which does not
address whether the agency may preempt its wheeling arrangements if the agency
decides to make its own use of the portion of the "unused capacity" through which the
water is wheeled. Section 901(a) makes clear that, once a wheeling commitment is
made, the agency is obligated to honor that commitment throughout the term of the
wheeling agreement. The parties would be free, of course, to enter into an interruptible
wheeling arrangement by mutual consent.
Section 901(b) defines several terms that are relevant to the
administration of Part I. "Water supply system" includes all of the public water
supply agency's diversion, storage, transportation, treatment, distribution, and
related facilities required to accomplish the transfer of water by the legal water
user. The term "unused capacity" is defined as:
the portion of the public water supply agency's supply system,
if any, not required by the agency during the term of the water
transfer agreement to supply water obtained by the agency or
its members and customers from water rights, contracts, or
other entitlements that exist at the time the legal water user
requests permission to use the agency's water supply system.
This definition clarifies the current legal definition of "unused capacity"149 by
stipulating that the existence and amount of unused capacity must be
determined as of the date on which the legal water user requests permission to
wheel water through the agency's facilities, taking into account the agency's
then existing water supply obligations. Many of the participants in the focus
groups agreed that this would be a valuable clarification of the present
definition of "unused capacity," which does not specify that the determination of
capacity available for wheeling made at the outset of the wheeling agreement
shall be binding on the agency throughout the term of the agreement.
Section 901(b) also defines which "public water supply agencies" are
subject to the wheeling rules of Part I. In contrast to the definition of "local
water supply agency" as used in Part H, the definition of public water supply
agencies for purposes of Part I includes the United States Bureau of
Reclamation and the California Department of Water Resources, but excludes
privately owned water suppliers.
Section 902 establishes procedures for the agency's review of wheeling requests.
All such requests must be made in writing and must include a description of the water
transfer that is the subject of the request, a statement of the quantity of water involved,
the dates on which the requested wheeling would occur, and identification of the
portion of the agency's water supply system to which the request applies. The agency
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would have thirty days to determine the amount of unused capacity available to serve
the wheeling request and to notify the requesting party of its decision. If the agency
granted the request, the notice would include a statement of the terms and conditions
of the wheeling agreement.
Section 903 sets forth the substantive standards applicable to wheeling
agreements. The agency could impose reasonable terms and conditions to protect
the water quality of its system, to ensure that it receives "fair reimbursement" for
the use of its system, and to protect other defined legal interests.
Subsection 903(a) authorizes the agency to deny, or to place conditions
on, wheeling in accordance with the following criteria:
1.
If the wheeling could be implemented only by blending the transferred
water with other water in the agency's supply system, the agency may
charge the legal water user for any additional costs of treatment of the
blended water attributable to the addition of the transferred water to the
system.
2.
If the wheeling could be implemented only by blending the transferred
water with other water in the agency's system, and the addition of the
transferred water would diminish the quality of the water in the system to
such an extent that the blended water could not be treated for distribution
to the agency's other members and customers using the agency's existing
water treatment facilities, the agency may prohibit or place conditions on
the transfer as required to protect the water quality within its system.
Subsection 903(a) also would permit the agency to impose other reasonable terms
and conditions to comply with applicable water quality and environmental standards.
Subsection 903(b) defines the financial charges that the agency may
impose on the use of its facilities. This subsection limits the agency to "fair
reimbursement" of the costs attributable to the use of its systems. "Fair
reimbursement" is defined as:
1.
the portion of the capital, operation, maintenance, and replacement costs
paid by the agency for the portion of the unused capacity made available
by the agency for the transfer of water by the legal water user;
2.
the cost of supplemental power purchased or used by the local
water agency to transfer the additional water for the benefit of the
legal water user;
3.
the additional cost of treating the water in the agency's water supply
system caused by the blending of the water transferred by the legal
water user with the other water in the agency's system; and
a reasonable fee for the administration costs incurred by the agency
4.
in its review of the legal water user's request to use the unused
capacity in the agency's water supply system.
Subsection 903(b) also requires the agency to credit to the wheeling parties the
value of any benefits that might accrue to the agency from the wheeling
arrangement, including decreases in power or treatment costs. It does not
permit the agency to equalize the costs of wheeling and the costs charged to the
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members of the agency for use of the facilities, nor does it allow the agency to
charge the wheeling parties for the "stranded investment" of the agency.
Subsection 903(c) was added to address concerns expressed at several of the
focus groups regarding the possible legal consequences of private use of public
facilities. This subsection would permit the agency to deny, or to place reasonable
terms and conditions on, the use of its system by private persons or entities "to ensure
that the private use of the agency's system does not jeopardize the agency's taxexempt status, affect the agency's authority to issue tax-exempt bonds, or violate the
requirements or limitations of federal law." The last criterion was included in response
to San Francisco's concerns that the use of its Hetch Hetchy Project by private water
purveyors might violate the terms of its Raker Act grant.
Section 904 provides that disputes arising under Part I would be subject to
binding arbitration. These arbitrable disputes would include arguments over the
existence or quantification of unused capacity, disputes over the agency's imposition
of terms and conditions to protect water quality, and disagreements regarding
calculation of "fair reimbursement." Disputes arising under section 903(c) would be
exempt from arbitration and would be subject to judicial review. In all arbitrations
under Part I, the water supply agency would have the burden of proof.
Section 905 simply grants public water supply agencies authority to
promulgate rules, bylaws, and other policies to govern the wheeling of water in
accordance with the requirements of Part I.
Part J:

Water Banks

Water users in a variety of areas have formed regional water banks or
pooling arrangements to facilitate the transfer of water within the region. In
addition, during each of the last two severe droughts—1976 to 1977 and 1987
through 1992—statewide water banks were created to assist in the transfer of
water from areas of surplus to areas of severe shortage.150 Part J recognizes the
importance of these innovations and therefore would provide permanent statutory
authority for the creation of a state water bank and regional water banks.
Section 1001 empowers the Governor to establish a State Water Bank on
either a temporary or permanent basis. The State Water Bank would be
administered by the Department of Water Resources and would have authority to
take any action to facilitate voluntary transfers of water, including the acquisition of
water or water rights for subsequent transfer to willing buyers or for other state
purposes, "including augmentation of water supplies to wetlands, fish and wildlife,
and other instream beneficial uses." To reduce the possibility of the State Water
bank dominating California's water market, the Bank would not have exclusive
jurisdiction over water transfers. Thus, section 1001 declares that "[a]ny person or
entity may transfer water without the involvement of the State Water Bank."

150.

See supra text at notes 22, 36.
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In 1993, the Department of Water Resources prepared a programmatic
environmental impact report on the 1991-1992 State Water Bank.151 Accordingly,
section 1001 provides that the establishment and operation of the State Water
Bank would be exempt from the environmental review requirements of CEQA.
The Department would be required to review and revise the programmatic EIR
at least once every five years, however, to ensure the currency and accuracy of
information required to assess the environmental consequences of State Water
Bank operations. Moreover, consistent with section 209 of the Model Act,
section 1001 also states that short-term agreements to transfer water by or
through the State Water Bank are exempt from CEQA.
Finally, section 1001 allows the Governor to delegate to the State Water Bank
authority to administer expedited transfer provisions of Part E for expedited transfers
of conserved water by or through the Bank. The State Water Bank successfully
administered most of the water transfers that occurred during the 1991-1992 drought,
and section 1001 provides permanent statutory authorization for future State Water
Banks to assume regulatory responsibility for expedited transfers.
Section 1002 authorizes local water agencies, local governments, and individual
water users to create regional water banks. Regional water banks would have authority
to take a variety of actions to facilitate voluntary water transfers, including:
1.
establishment of a list of current offers to sell and to purchase water
and water rights;
2.
acquisition of water for subsequent sale or distribution to members
of the water bank or for sale to willing buyers outside the water bank;
3.
acquisition and storage of water during periods of surplus for sale
and distribution during periods of shortage;
4.
acquisition and sale of water transfer options, water futures,
subordination agreements, and other types of arrangements to
transfer water for the benefit of the members of the water bank;
establishment of a local or regional program for the conjunctive
5.
management and use of surface and groundwater supplies owned or
controlled by members of the water bank;
6.
augmentation of water supplies to wetlands, fish and wildlife, and
other instream beneficial uses;
7.
facilitation of transfers by management of water storage, water
delivery, accounting, financing, or other matters relevant to the
interests of the members of the water bank;
8.
provision of assistance to potential transferors and transferees in
the negotiation and implementation of transfer agreements; and
creation of an insurance system to pay claims for compensation
9.
brought by third parties against water transfers implemented
through the bank on behalf of the members of the bank.

151. CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, PROGRAM ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT: STATE
DROUGHT WATER BANK (1993).
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All actions taken by regional water banks must be consistent with the other
provisions of the Model Act.
As with the State Water Bank, regional water banks would not have
exclusive jurisdiction over water transfers within their jurisdictional area. Thus,
section 1002 states that "[a]ny person or entity may transfer water without the
involvement of a regional water bank." The establishment of regional water
banks would be subject to CEQA. Consistent with section 209, however, shortterm agreements to transfer water by or through regional water banks would be
exempt from CEQA's environmental review requirements.
Finally, to decentralize the administration of expedited transfers, section
1002 authorizes the Board to delegate to regional water banks its authority to
supervise expedited transfers of conserved water undertaken pursuant to Part E.
Part K:

State Water Resources Control Board

Part K is comprised of three brief sections that address the responsibilities
of the State Water Resources Control Board.
Section 1001 preserves the Board's authority to enforce the terms and
conditions of permits and licenses within its existing statutory jurisdiction and
to ensure that, throughout the term of all water transfers, the impoundment,
storage, diversion, distribution, use, and return flow of water comply with
applicable water quality standards, the reasonable use laws, and other relevant
provisions of state and federal law.
Section 1102 was added at the suggestion of several environmental
representatives who participated in the focus groups. It requires the Board to create
and maintain a "Water Transfer Registry" of all water transfers governed by the Model
Act. The Registry would include the names of the parties to the transfer, a brief
description of the transfer, and an explanation of the changes in water storage, timing
and point of diversion, place and purpose of use, consumption, and timing and point
of return flow caused by the transfer. The purpose of the Registry is to consolidate
information regarding water transfers so that government agencies and interested
members of the public could obtain current and accurate data regarding water
transfers. This Registry would be particularly important for transfers to instream uses
governed by Part F, because it would help to inform the Board and other agencies of
the quantity of water that is dedicated to instream purposes and therefore must be set
aside from regulatory water quality and stream flow requirements in accordance with
section 602.152 To promote public access and use of the water transfer date, section
1102 instructs the Board to ensure that the Water Transfer Registry is available both in
print form and over the internet.
Section 1103 simply directs the Board to review its existing rules and policies
and amend such rules and policies as necessary to ensure that they comply with the
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See Thomas, supra note 38, at 49-51.
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terms of this Act. Section 1103 also states that the Board has authority to promulgate
other rules that it determines would assist in the implementation of the Model Act.
Part L:

Miscellaneous

Part L concludes the Model Act with a few "housekeeping details."
Section 1201 repeals, as of the effective date of enactment of the statute,
the existing water transfer laws that the Model Act would supersede. The
provisions of the Water Code that would be repealed are sections 109, 380-387,
470-484. 1020-1030, 1435-1442, 1700-1707, 1725-1745.11, and 1810-1814.
Section 1202 states that the courts generally would have authority to enforce the
requirements of the Model Act, but would have no power to adjudicate disputes
arising under Parts D, E, and I, except as specifically provided in those Parts. This
exception is included because Parts D, E, and I either limit the scope of judicial review
or refer most disputes over implementation to binding arbitration.
Section 1203 provides simply that, whenever the Model Act refers to any
other statute, "the reference shall apply to all amendments of the other statute."
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